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Despite the best efforts of questionnaire designers, survey respondents don’t 
always interpret questions as the question writers intended.  Researchers have used 
Grice’s conversational maxims to explain some of these discrepancies.  This dissertation 
extends this work by reviewing studies on the use of Grice’s maxims by survey 
respondents and describing six new experiments that looked for direct evidence that 
respondents apply Grice’s maxims.   
The strongest evidence for respondents’ use of the maxims came from an 
experiment that varied the numerical labels on a rating scale; the mean shift in responses 
to the right side of the rating scale induced by negative numerical labels was robust 
across items and fonts.  Process measures indicated that respondents applied the maxim 
of relation in interpreting the questions.  Other evidence supported use of the maxim of 
quantity — as predicted, correlations between two highly similar items were lower when 
they were asked together.  Reversing the wording of one of the items didn’t prevent 
respondents from applying the maxim of quantity.   Evidence was weaker for the 
application of Grice’s maxim of manner; respondents still seemed to use definitions (as 
was apparent from the reduced variation in their answers), even though the definitions 
were designed to be uninformative.  That direct questions without filters induced 
significantly more responses on the upper end of the scale — presumably because of the 
presuppositions direct questions carried — supported respondents’ application of the 
maxim of quality.  There was little support for respondents’ use of the maxim of relation 
from an experiment on the physical layout of survey questions; the three different layouts 
didn’t influence how respondents perceived the relation among items.   
These results provided some evidence that both survey “satisficers” and survey 
“optimizers” may draw automatic inferences based on Gricean maxims, but that only 
“optimizers” will carry out the more controlled processes requiring extra effort.  Practical 
implications for survey practice include the need for continued attention to secondary 
features of survey questions in addition to traditional questionnaire development issues.  
Additional experiments that incorporate other techniques such as eye tracking or 
cognitive interviews may help to uncover other subtle mechanisms affecting survey 
responses. 
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1Chapter 1 Prior Work on Gricean Influences in Surveys 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Survey errors are often classified into coverage, sampling, nonresponse, and 
measurement errors (Groves, 1989).  Measurement errors are further subdivided by 
source – the interviewer, the respondent, or the instrument (Groves, 1989).  The 
traditional mathematical model of survey error, as set forth in the work by Hansen, 
Hurwitz, and Madow (1953), and Cochran (1977), starts with the variance of the sample 
mean of a variable measured without error and based on a simple random sample, and 
then adds additional variance components representing measurement error (Hansen, 
Hurwitz, & Bershad, 1961).  Implicit in the Hansen-Hurwitz-Bershad measurement error 
model is the emphasis on the interview process (the “essential survey conditions”) and on 
the “processors” of survey data (including supervisors, interviewers, coders, etc.) rather 
than on individual respondents.  The traditional model assigns respondents a passive role 
and largely ignores them.  Another weakness of this model lies in its focus on the 
consequences (rather than causes) of measurement error on survey estimates.  The model 
is not informative as to how measurement errors arise or how to prevent or reduce them.   
The CASM (Cognitive Aspects of Survey Methodology) movement in the 80s 
and 90s fostered a shift in survey methods research to the cognitive paradigm.  The 
CASM movement focused on the cognitive processes by which respondents arrive at and 
report an answer using concepts drawn mostly from cognitive psychology (see Hippler, 
Schwarz, & Sudman, 1987; Jabine, Straf, Tanur, & Tourangeau, 1984; Sirken, Herrmann, 
Schechter, Schwarz, Tanur, & Tourangeau, 1999; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996).  
This new paradigm centered on the causes of measurement errors and motivated practical 
2measures to reduce these errors (Tourangeau, 2003).  However, many of the problems in 
surveys seem to involve respondents’ comprehension of the questions.  As a result, the 
work inspired by CASM did not provide a complete account of measurement error (even 
from a cognitive perspective) because most of this research concerned memory and 
judgment (Tourangeau, 1999; O’Muircheartaigh, 1999). 
Conversational analysis represents an alternative approach to understanding the 
survey response process (see Schaeffer, 1991).  Suchman and Jordan (1990), in an 
analysis of two survey interviews, describe the very different view that respondents may 
have of the survey interview from that of the researchers.  Criticizing the standardized 
interviewing style, they consider the interview process as involving the joint participation 
of the interviewer and the respondent in a speech event – a communication – where each 
has expectations as well as responsibilities (Suchman & Jordan, 1990).  Following up on 
this critique of standardized interviewing, Conrad and Schober (2000) and Schober and 
Conrad (1997) provided empirical evidence that the standardized interviewing style can 
reduce response accuracy in certain circumstances.  Conversational (or flexible) 
interviewing, by contrast, improves individual response accuracy, but at the expense of 
increasing interview time and, thus, increasing cost.  
There is an additional discipline – linguistics – that could provide additional tools 
for understanding comprehension problems.  As a matter of fact, linguistics remains one 
of the disciplines that have been neglected by survey researchers, a point made by 
Tourangeau (1999).  Fillmore (1999) pointed out problems in surveys that could have 
been avoided or solved through the application of linguistic knowledge and called for 
greater attention to linguistics from survey researchers.  Schwarz and his colleagues had 
3already begun to use linguistics, applying one area of linguistic theory – Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle (CP) – to the survey research setting.  Schwarz and his colleagues 
have construed survey research as a conversation between survey researchers and survey 
respondents (see Schwarz, 1996, for a thorough review; see Tourangeau, Rips, & 
Rasinski, 2000 for related issues).  Such a conversational model of research is also 
advocated in another field by Kihlstrom (1995), who argued in favor of viewing 
experiments from the subject’s point of view.   
Schwarz and colleagues demonstrated that many response effects are the result of 
respondents’ (sometimes incorrect) belief that survey researchers are cooperative and 
abide by Grice’s conversational maxims.  I will review the work of Schwarz and his 
colleagues as well as the work of other survey researchers on respondents’ application of 
Grice’s maxims in the survey research setting.  
 I begin by reviewing the theoretical formulation and development of Grice’s CP 
before discussing the (mostly) experimental studies that examine CP in the survey 
research setting.   
 
1.2 Theoretical Formulation and Development of CP 
Sentences versus utterances .  H. P. Grice first proposed the Cooperative 
Principle (CP) and the associated maxims in the 1967 William James Lectures at Harvard 
University.  The CP lays out a mechanism through which people go beyond simple 
sentence meanings to derive the speaker’s intentions.  It bridges “what is said” with 
“what is implied” through implicatures – inferences the listener makes regarding the 
speakers’ intentions (Grice, 1975).    
4Traditionally, linguistics has regarded sentences as a collection of abstract 
linguistic symbols.  Sentence meanings are understood as “the overall meaning composed 
from the meanings of all the constituents together with the meaning of the constructions 
in which they occur” (Levinson, 1995, p. 91).  Sentence meanings fall into the realm of 
semantics (or, in Fillmore’s categorization (1999), lexical semantics plus compositional 
semantics), which deals with the common core of meaning and the systematic process by 
which overall meaning is built out of the meaning of the parts (Levinson, 1995; Sperber 
& Wilson, 1995).  Utterances are treated as pairings of sentences and contexts; the 
meaning of an utterance refers to the “import” of a sentence in a particular context 
(Levinson, 1995).  Different utterances of the same sentence may differ in their import 
because of the context in which each utterance occurs.  Within linguistics, the study of 
utterance meanings belongs to pragmatics.  
The distinction between sentences and utterances and between sentence meanings 
and utterance meanings is by now familiar to language researchers.  We all have the 
experience of speaking one thing to mean something else.  For instance, when one person 
says to another: “It is getting dark,” the speaker could mean that the listener should turn 
on the light, or that the listener should leave, or even that the listener should stay for 
dinner.  Any of these utterance meanings could be right or all of them could be wrong.  
The deciding factor is not the linguistic structure (i.e., the sentence), which remains 
constant across contexts, but rather the context in which the utterance occurs.  
Consequently, the question remains how the listener should interpret the speaker’s 
utterance in a given context.  
5Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the conversational maxims.  Grice (1989) 
offered one answer to these questions in his lectures:  
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks. … 
They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each 
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or 
at least a mutually accepted direction. … We might then formulate a rough general 
principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make 
your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage where it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (p. 26). 
 
Grice labeled this the Cooperative Principle (CP).  Table 1.1 summarizes the associated 
subordinate maxims. 
Table 1.1.   Grice’s Four Conversational Maxims 
Maxim of Quantity 1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for 
current purposes);  
2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required. 
Maxim of Quality Try to make your contribution one that is true;  
1) Do not say what you believe to be false;  
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Maxim of Relation Be relevant. 
Maxim of Manner Be perspicuous, and specifically:  
1) Avoid obscurity;  
2) Avoid ambiguity;  
3) Be brief;  
4) Be orderly. 
Grice asserts that people generally follow these rules for efficient communication.  
However, he didn’t intend his account of the CP to be a prescriptive one.  On the contrary, 
he admits that people do not follow these guidelines to the letter.  Rather “…in most 
ordinary kinds of talk these principles are oriented to, such that when talk does not 
proceed according to specifications, hearers assume that, contrary to appearances, the 
principles are nevertheless adhered to at some deeper level” (Levinson, 1983, p. 102).  In 
other words, Grice believes that the CP and the associated maxims are normally observed 
by the participants in a talk exchange either at the level of what is said (the semantic 
6meaning of sentences) or failing that, at the level of what is implicated (the utterance 
meanings or implicatures).  
 Theoretical development.  Grice’s maxims lay out a research direction more 
than a complete, well-specified framework.  He acknowledges that his list of maxims is 
far from exhaustive and that there are all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or 
moral in character) that are normally observed by participants in talk exchanges (Grice 
1989, p. 28).  One line of development in pragmatics since Grice adds new maxims to 
supplement and extend Grice’s original maxims.  Leech and his Politeness Principle 
(1983) and Brown and Levinson’s Politeness Principle (1987) are representatives of this 
approach.   
This expansionism has been criticized as a seemingly endless addition of 
principles/maxims whenever situations call for it.  Led by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 
1995), reductionist critics replaces maxims with just a single Principle of Relevance (later 
renamed by them the Communicative Principle of Relevance in the 1995 edition): “the 
speaker tries to be as relevant as possible in the circumstances” (1986, p. 381).  But as 
Davis (1998) pointed out, Sperber and Wilson’s principle has the same difficulty as 
Grice’s CP.  Both are intended to be general enough to hold in all cases, but end up being 
too general to yield specific predictions.  It is difficult to summarize Sperber and 
Wilson’s theory because the formulation of the theory varies significantly from 
presentation to presentation (Davis, 1998, p. 99). 
 The Neo-Gricean school is the third line of development after Grice’s initial work 
(Horn, 1984; Horn & Ward, 2004).  It emphasizes the quantity maxim as the core of 
7Grice’s system and collapses Grice’s maxims into two principles—Q(uantity) and 
R(elation).  Table 1.2 summarizes Horn’s Q and R principles (Horn, 1984).  
Table 1.2.   Horn’s Neo-Gricean Principles vs. Grice’s Original Formulation 
Horn’s Principles Encompassing Grice’s maxims 
The Q 
Principle 
(hearer-based) 
Make your contribution 
sufficient (cf. Quantity1). Say 
as much as you can (given R).  
Quantity1: Make your contribution as 
informative as is required (for the 
given purpose of the exchange). 
The R 
Principle 
(speaker-
based) 
Make your contribution 
necessary (cf. Relation, 
Quantity2, and Manner). Say no 
more than you must (given Q). 
Quantity2: Do not make your 
contribution more informative than is 
required. 
Maxim of Manner 
Maxim of Relation 
Note: Adapted from Horn (1984, p. 13). 
Despite these various criticisms, Grice’s CP and its maxims continue to be 
regarded as the main model of the tacit agreement between participants in natural 
conversational settings.  Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Horn’s Neo-Gricean 
principles are too abstract to permit the prediction of potential inferences drawn by 
participants; therefore, they are not directly testable.  As a result, most survey researchers 
have focused on Grice’s maxims (cf. Schwarz, 1996).  Strack (1994) is the only 
researcher who has attempted to examine the politeness principle in survey research 
setting.  In the next section, I will review experimental work that explores the relevance 
of Grice’s maxims to the survey research setting and show examples of measurement 
error resulting from respondents’ application of the CP in the context of survey research. 
 
1.3 Gricean Effects in Survey Research 
Survey interviews are similar to everyday conversations for two reasons.  First of 
all, in both settings, at least two parties are involved – survey researchers (sometimes via 
interviewers) and survey respondents (see Kihlstrom, 1995; Schwarz, 1996).  Secondly, 
8like natural conversational exchanges, survey interviews involve speech acts; in the case 
of surveys, a crucial speech act is the request for information from respondents as 
specified by the question’s meaning.  On the other hand, as noted quite often, survey 
interviews are also quite different from daily conversation (Suchman & Jordan, 1990).  
The most significant difference between the two settings is that survey interviews – 
especially standardized interviews – are highly constrained (Clark & Schober, 1992; 
Schwarz, 1996).  Whereas speakers and addressees collaborate in ordinary conversations 
“to establish intended word meanings, intended interpretations of full utterances, 
implications of utterances, mutually recognized purposes, and many other such things” 
(Clark & Schober, 1992, p. 25), their opportunity to do so is severely limited in survey 
interviews, partially due to survey researchers’ attempt to standardize the interview 
process (Schwarz, 1996, 1999).  
Because of these differences between ordinary conversation and survey 
interviews, Schwarz speculates that respondents not only bring Grice’s maxims to the 
survey interviewing situations but also are forced to rely more on these tacit assumptions 
than they would be in daily life to derive the intended meanings of the survey questions 
(Schwarz, 1996).  Unlike participants in ordinary conversations, interviewers are not 
permitted to clarify their utterances.  Respondents assume (correctly or incorrectly) that 
every contribution of the survey researcher is relevant to the aims of the ongoing 
conversation, that every contribution is informative, truthful, relevant, and clear (Schwarz, 
1996; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  Although the survey designers may have 
only the semantic meaning of a question in mind when asking the question, respondents 
still assume that the question obeys Grice’s maxims (Schwarz, 1999).  That is, 
9respondents may read between the lines, finding meaning in incidental features of the 
question and “rendering logically irrelevant information conversationally relevant” 
(Schwarz, 2000, p. 152).  Accordingly, the question that respondents attempt to answer 
might be different from the one survey designers intend to ask.  Such a mismatch or gap 
in understanding influences respondents’ responses to questions and contributes to 
measurement error in surveys.  Numerous demonstrations of such measurement errors 
can be found in the survey literature.  Each can be attributed to the application of Grice’s 
maxims by survey respondents.  
 
1.3.1 Maxim of Quantity 
The maxim of quantity requires speakers to make their contribution informative, 
but no more informative than is required.  A number of studies illustrate the application 
of the maxims of quantity in a survey setting.  Table 1.3 summarizes them.  
 There are two main situations in which respondents seem to apply the maxim of 
quantity to arrive at inferences about the intended meanings of survey questions.  One 
situation involves part-whole questions.  Respondents are asked one question that calls 
for an evaluation of some general domain or category (e.g., their overall happiness), and 
another question that calls for an evaluation of a highly salient member of that domain 
(e.g., marital happiness).  Typically, when the specific question precedes the more 
general question, it alters answers to the general question (Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau, 
Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  One explanation for this finding goes as follows: when two 
questions are in the same conversation context and seem to ask for the same 
10
Table 1.3. Summaries of Studies on Maxim of Quantity
Study Questions Results Inference/Explanation
Strack,
Schwarz, and
Wanke (1991,
Experiment 2)
Similar items –“How
happy are you…?” and
“How satisfied are
you…?”
Lower correlations when the items are in the same
conversational context than when they are in
different conversational contexts
When in same
conversational context,
respondents infer
difference in meanings
between two highly
similar items to avoid
redundancy.
Kalton, Collins,
and Brook
(1978)
Specific-General –
“Drivers in general,” and
“Young drivers”
Higher percentage of people say driving standards
are lower when the general question is asked first
than when the general question is asked second
Mason,
Carlson, and
Tourangeau
(1994)
Specific-General – “Local
economy,” and “State
economy”
More optimism about state economy when it is
asked first. Lower optimism when it follows
specific question.
McCabe and
Brannon (2004)
Specific-General –
“Romantic satisfaction,”
and “Overall satisfaction”
Attenuated correlations between the two question
when presented with a joint lead-in only for
respondents who have a high need for cognition.
Schwarz,
Strack, and Mai
(1991)
Specific-General –
“Romantic satisfaction,”
and “Overall satisfaction”
Strack, Martin,
and Schwarz
(1988)
Specific-General –
“Happiness with dating”/
“Frequency of dating” and
“Happiness with life in
general”
Tourangeau,
Rasinski, and
Bradburn
(1991)
Specific-General –
“Happiness with
marriage,” and “Overall
happiness”
High correlations when general question first or
with explicit inclusion wording; low correlations
when specific question first, joint lead-in, or with
explicit exclusion wording
When a specific
question is asked before
general one, information
used to answer the
specific question is
excluded from
answering the
subsequent general
question because
respondents infer
general question calls
for something new
(avoiding redundancy).
11
information, respondents reinterpret the general question as excluding the specific 
mentioned in the prior question, taking the general item to mean something like “aside 
from…” (Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  These speculations have 
been supported by a several similar studies (Kalton, Collins, & Brook, 1978; Mason, 
Carlson, & Tourangeau, 1994; McCabe & Brannon, 2004; Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991; 
Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988; Tourangeau, Rasinski, & Bradburn, 1991).  
Schwarz et al. (1991), Strack et al. (1988), and Tourangeau et al. (1991) asked 
respondents about their happiness with marriage/romance/dating (the specific question) 
and about general happiness (the general question).  All three studies show that the 
correlations between the general and specific items are lower when the general question 
comes second (indicating that respondents exclude their marriages/dating when they 
evaluate their overall happiness under this order), when the question explicitly calls for 
their exclusion, or when the two questions are perceived to be in same conversational 
context.  The findings are displayed in Table 1.4 (adapted from Table 7.2 in Tourangeau, 
Rips, & Rasinski, 2000, p. 205). 
Table 1.4. Correlations Between Responses to General and Specific Questions, by 
Study and Condition 
Strack et al. (1988) Schwarz et al. (1991) 
Condition Experiment 1
Experiment 
2
Tourangeau 
et al. 
(1991) One Specific Question 
Three Specific 
Questions 
General-specific .16 (60) -.12 (60) .54 (60) -- .32 (50) 
Specific-general  
No introduction 
 
.55 (60) 
 
.66 (60) 
 
-- 
 
.67 (50) 
 
.46 (50) 
Specific-general  
Joint lead-in 
 
.26 (60) 
 
.15 (60) 
 
.28 (53) 
 
.18 (56) 
 
.48 (56) 
Specific-general  
Exclusion wording 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
.27 (54) 
 
.20 (50) 
 
.11 (50) 
Specific-general  
Inclusion wording 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
.52 (59) 
 
.61 (50) 
 
.53 (50) 
Note: Parenthetical entries are sample sizes. 
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A third study, by Kalton, Collins, and Brook (1978), looked into another topic—
driving standards for drivers in general and for young drivers (see Table 1.3).  Not 
surprisingly, they found a lower percentage of people saying driving standards were 
getting lower for drivers in general when the general question came after a question about 
young drivers.  Again, when the general question followed the specific question, the 
general driving standards seemed to be reinterpreted as meaning ‘drivers aside from 
young drivers.’  
In addition to being the basis for respondents’ inference that the general question 
is meant to exclude material and/or information used in answering an earlier, more 
specific question, Grice’s maxim of quantity may also cause respondents to disregard 
accessible information simply because they feel that the task or question calls for 
something new and different (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  Mason, Carlson, and 
Tourangeau (1994) provide an example.  They asked respondents to report their 
expectations about the prospects for both their state and local economy and to explain 
why they felt that way.  When the local economy question was asked first, the reasons 
pertaining to the local economy (e.g., high unemployment) were not given again for the 
state economy, apparently because respondents felt their answers to the second question 
should be based on something new (Mason et al., 1994).  As a result, the distribution of 
reasons cited for the general item was altered, when that item followed the more specific 
question.  
McCabe and Brannon (2004) reported a partial replication of Schwarz, Strack, 
and Mai (1991).  However, this study differs from the previous studies on part-whole 
questions in that it linked respondents’ application of the maxim of quantity with their 
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need for cognition.  McCabe and Brannon found that respondents with a high need for 
cognition displayed an attenuated correlation between satisfaction ratings when the two 
items had a joint lead-in, but not respondents with a low need for cognition.  This finding 
seemed to support the notion that the conversational norm to avoid redundancy is not 
automatically applied in the survey context and that the observed reduction in 
correlations is not the result of respondents’ ‘satisficing’ (i.e., their tendency to reduce 
cognitive burden by taking various shortcuts).  Rather, those with a high need for 
cognition – who are thought to pay more attention to questions and to process survey 
questions more carefully – are affected by the manipulation of the order of the two 
questions.  
The other situation that seems to reflect the application of the maxim of quantity 
involves two highly similar items in the same questionnaire.  For instance, Strack, 
Schwarz, and Wanke (1991, Experiment 2) asked respondents to rate both their happiness 
(“How happy are you…?”) and their satisfaction with life (“How satisfied are you…?) in 
a single questionnaire.  The two items are quite similar and appear to invite redundant 
answers from respondents.  However, respondents appeared to infer that the two similar 
items must mean something different when they were presented in the same part of the 
questionnaire; according to Strack and his coauthors, respondents exaggerated the small 
difference in meaning between happiness and satisfaction so that the questions no longer 
violated the Cooperative Principle.  The findings confirmed this account – correlations 
between the two ratings were much smaller when the two items were administered in a 
single questionnaire than in different ones (Strack, Schwarz, & Wanke, 1991). 
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1.3.2 Maxim of Quality 
Respondents sometimes offer opinions about highly obscure or even fictitious 
issues.  Indeed, Converse (1970) argued they often provide random answers to survey 
questions based on a mental flip of a coin.  Grice’s CP and the maxim of quality offer an 
alternative explanation for why respondents provide answers to survey questions.  
Respondents answer questions on fictitious or highly obscure issues because they assume 
that the survey designers are being cooperative.  The sheer fact that a researcher asks a 
question about some issue presupposes that the issue exists (or else asking a question 
about it would be uncooperative).  As a result, the respondents search the context for cues 
and attempt to make sense of the obscure or fictitious issue.  
An experiment from Strack, Schwarz, and Wanke (1991, Experiment 1) 
demonstrates this process.  German respondents were asked about their support for an 
undefined ‘educational contribution.’  Based on the presupposition of the question – that 
something called an ‘educational contribution’ exists – respondents tried to assign a 
reasonable meaning to the term.  When the question followed another question asking for 
their estimate of the amount of tuition students have to pay at U.S. universities, they 
inferred that ‘educational contribution’ was to be taken from them.  But when the same 
question was preceded by a question asking them to estimate the amount of money the 
Swedish government pays students, they inferred that the ‘educational contribution’ was 
to be given to them.  They then answered the question according to their interpretation of 
the educational contribution; they showed more support for it when the contribution was 
to be given to them than to be taken from them (Strack, Schwarz, & Wanke, 1991).  In 
this case, an inference based on the maxim of relation resolves an apparent violation of 
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the maxim of quality.  Another study by Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988), which will be 
discussed more in detail later, exhibited a similar use of the maxim of relation.  
In the same way, questions such as “How many times did you go shopping in the 
past month?” or “How concerned are you with pollution?” presuppose that one went 
shopping or one should be concerned about pollution, which may not be an appropriate 
assumption.  Nonetheless, assuming that these presuppositions are true, respondents may 
reinterpret the question.  For example, they may reinterpret shopping broadly as 
encompassing, say, trips to the drug store or grocery.  However, a prior “filter” item (e.g., 
“Did you go shopping in the past month?” or “Are you concerned with pollution?”) 
cancels such presuppositions, explicitly legitimizing the “did not go shopping” and “not 
concerned” responses.   
Knauper (1988) reports a study that seems to illustrate these interpretive processes.  
She found that respondents reported more crimes (and less severe ones) when they were 
asked “In the past 10 years, how many times did you witness a crime?” directly, but 
reported fewer and more severe crimes when a filter “Did you witness a crime in the past 
10 years?” was used first.  Similar findings were reported by Sterngold, Warland, and 
Herrmann (1994), who argued that direct questions about respondents’ level of concern 
encouraged respondents to overstate their concerns.  The use of filter questions greatly 
reduced respondents’ reported concern and produced fewer responses in the upper part of 
the scale.  Table 1.5 summarizes the studies demonstrating inferences based on the 
maxim of quality in the context of survey questionnaires.  
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Table 1.5. Studies Examining the Maxim of Quality
Study Target Questions Result Inference/Explanation
Strack, Schwarz,
and
Wanke (1991,
Experiment 1)
Fictitious issue –
“educational
contribution”
More support for the target
item when it followed an item
about government financial
support for students in Sweden
than one about tuition in US.
Respondents assigned meaning to the
fictitious issue using contextual information
(the preceding question).
Tourangeau and
Rasinski (1988)
Obscure term –
“Monetary Control Bill”
(MCB)
More support for MCB when
the item followed block of
inflation questions than when
inflation questions are
scattered among questions on
unrelated issues.
Respondents inferred topic of Monetary
Control Bill must be inflation when the item
followed a block of inflation questions.
Knauper (1998) With filter vs. without
filter – “How many times
did you experience X?”
Significantly fewer reports
when first asked filtered
question than without filter
question.
Question ‘How many times did you
experience X?’ presupposes one has
experienced X; so respondents inferred X
included less serious, more frequent
incidents. The filtered question, on the other
hand, canceled the presupposition and
respondents reasoned survey designers meant
more serious, rarer incidents.
Sterngold,
Warland,
and Herrmann
(1994)
With filter vs. without
filter – “How concerned
are you about Y?”
A higher percentage of ‘not
concerned’ responses and
fewer responses at the upper
end of the response scale with
filtered question than when
items without filters asked
Question “How concerned are you with…”
implies one should be concerned about it,
encouraging respondent to overstate their
concerns. A filter reduces such an implication
by legitimizing ‘not concerned’ responses.
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1.3.3 Maxim of Relation  
This maxim is probably the most powerful and general of Grice’s maxims, which 
justifies efforts (like Sperber and Wilson’s) to reduce the other maxims to this one.  In the 
survey research context, the maxim of relation implies that everything about the 
questions is relevant to the question-answer process; they make use of every possible 
piece of information (such as nearby questions, the numerical values assigned to response 
scales, the range, and even the physical layout of the scales) to interpret the question and 
make the required judgment.  Relevant research is summarized in Table 1.6.  
 For instance, when a question is ambiguous or involves an obscure or unfamiliar 
issue, respondents try to infer its meaning from the questions around it.  Such inferences 
are based on the maxim of relation.  A study by Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) 
demonstrates the operation of the maxim of relation.  When the target question about the 
obscure “Monetary Control Bill” (MCB) was placed in a block of questions on inflation, 
respondents seemed to infer that the Monetary Control Bill must concern inflation (see 
also Schuman & Presser, 1981, pp. 154-160).  By contrast, when questions shifted from 
one topic to the next in the questionnaire, respondents no longer assumed the previous 
questions were relevant and were more likely to give a “No Opinion” response to the 
item about the MCB (Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988).  A similar finding was observed in 
the Strack, Schwarz, and Wanke’s study (1991), where respondents tried to infer the 
meaning of “educational contribution” by assuming the questions preceding the target 
item were related to it. 
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Table 1.6. Research Work on the Maxim of Relation
Study Target Questions Results Inference/Explanations
Strack, Schwarz
and Wanke (1991,
Experiment 1)
Fictitious issue –
“Educational contribution”
More support for the target item when it
followed an item about government
financial support for students in Sweden
than one about tuition in the US.
With the aid of relation maxim, respondents
assigned meaning to the fictitious issue using
contextual information (preceding question).
Tourangeau and
Rasinski (1988)
Obscure term – “Monetary
Control Bill” (MCB)
More support for the MCB when the
item followed a block of inflation
questions than when the inflation
questions were scattered among
questions on unrelated issues.
With the aid of relation maxim, respondents
inferred topic of Monetary Control Bill must be
inflation when the item followed block of
inflation questions.
Haddock and
Carrick (1999,
Experiment 1)
Rating scale – “Ratings of
Blair on four attributes”
-5 to 5 vs. 0 to 10
Blair was rated more favorably
(mean=6.9) in the -5 to 5 condition as
compared to 0 to 10 condition (6.4).
Blair was judged to be more effective
when respondents were asked to rate
him on four attributes on the -5 to 5
scale than on the 0 to 10 scale.
Numerical labels served as information that
affected respondents’ ratings of Blair on four
attributes. Furthermore, the trait ratings on the
different numerical scales influenced a
subsequent judgment about Blair’s predicted
effectiveness as Prime Minister.
O’Muircheartaigh,
Gaskell, and
Wright (1995,
Experiment 1)
Rating scale – “Opinion on
adverts on TV”
-5 to 5 vs. 0 to 10
More respondents selected value equal
or less than the midpoint given the 0 to
10 scale than when given the -5 to 5
scale.
“Much less entertaining than the programmes”
implies presence of negative evaluations when
combined with -5, but absence of positive
evaluations when combined with 0. Confirmed
Schwarz et al (1991)’s finding.
Schwarz, Grayson,
and Knäuper (1998,
Experiment 1)
Frequency scales – 0 to 10
vs. 1 to 11 (‘rarely’ to
‘often’)
Higher mean frequency ratings along the
0 to 10 scale (mean=3.8) than the 1 to 11
scale (2.9).
Respondents interpreted ‘rarely’ to mean
‘never’ when combined with 0, but to mean ‘a
low frequency’ when combined with 1.
Schwarz and
Hippler (1995)
Rating scale – “Opinion
toward politicians”
-5 to 5 vs. 0 to 10
More positive rating of politicians along
-5 to 5 scale (mean=5.6) than along 0 to
10 scale (4.9)
Respondents interpreted verbal label ‘don’t
think very highly’ to indicate absence of
positive thoughts when combined with 0, but
the presence of negative thoughts when
combined with -5.
Schwarz, Knauper,
Hippler, Noelle-
Neumann, and
Clark (1991,
Experiment1)
Rating scale – “Success in
life”
-5 to 5 vs. 0 to 10
Fewer people endorsed a value equal or
less than the midpoint on the -5 to 5
scale than on scale from 0 to 10.
-5 implies ‘presence of failure’ for end label
‘Not at all successful,’ and 0 implies ‘absence
of success’ for same end label.
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Study Target Questions Results Inference/Explanations
Schwarz, Grayson,
and Knäuper (1998,
Experiment 2)
Different shapes of a scale:
a set of stacked boxes;
onion format; pyramid
format
Students rated their academic
performance less favorably with
pyramid scale than with stacked boxes
and with onion format.
The wider bottom in the pyramid scale implies
researchers believe distribution includes more
people at the bottom.
Gaskell,
O’Muircheartaigh
and Wright (1994)
Frequency scale –
“Annoyance,” “Feeling
unsafe,” and “Being in
pain”
Low frequency vs. high
frequency
Fewer reports with low frequency scale;
more reports with high frequency scale
Low frequency scale implies lower rate of
occurrence in population
Schwarz, Strack,
Muller,
and Chassein
(1988)
Frequency scale –
“Irritation”
Low frequency vs. high
frequency
Students either provided a more serious
irritation or rated the standard example
as more annoying given low frequency
scale.
Low frequency scale implies that “irritation”
mean “serious irritations,” and high frequency
scale implies it means “minor irritations”
Schwarz and
Bienias (1990)
Frequency scale – “Weekly
TV consumption and
alcohol consumption”
Low frequency vs. high
frequency
Lower weekly TV watching and alcohol
consumption; more pronounced effect
with proxy reports than with self-reports
Schwarz, Bless,
Bohner, Harlacher,
and Kellenbenz
(1991,
Experimental 2)
Frequency scale –
“Seriousness of illness”
(Vignettes)
Low frequency vs. high
frequency
Suffering from a given symptom rated as
more severe and more likely to require
consultation when presented on a low
frequency scale.
Schwarz, Hippler,
Deutsch, and Strack
(1985)
Frequency scale – “TV
consumption;” “Satisfaction
with leisure time activities”
Low frequency vs. high
frequency
Less TV watching reported with low
frequency scale; also lower satisfaction
with leisure time activities; and higher
ratings of importance of TV
Schwarz and
Scheuring (1988)
Frequency scale –
“Masturbation;”
“Satisfaction with intimate
relationship;” “Interest in
extramarital affairs”
Low frequency vs. high
frequency
Lower frequency of
masturbation/intercourse; lower ratings
of satisfaction with intimate relationship
and higher ratings of interest in
extramarital affairs
Respondents use the range of the frequency
scales as a frame-of-reference to estimate their
own or others’ behavior, or to make
comparative judgment. Respondents make the
inference that the scale reflects the distribution
of the behavior, checking a response alternative
is equivalent to locating one’s own position in
the distribution.
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Study Target Questions Results Inference/Explanations
Ji, Schwarz, and
Nisbett (2001)
Frequency scale –
“Mundane behaviors for self
and for others”
Low frequency vs. high
frequency
(cross-cultural)
For western respondents, replicated
Schwarz et al. (1985); but not for eastern
respondents
Respondents use the range of the frequency
scales ‘frame-of-reference’ to estimate their
own and others’ behavior, and to make
comparative judgment. Respondents make the
inference that the scale reflects the distribution
of the behavior, checking a response alternative
is equivalent to locating one’s own position in
the distribution.
Norenzayan and
Schwarz (1999)
Researchers’ affiliation on
causal attributions
Provided more situational attributions
when researcher identified as a social
scientist rather than a personality
psychologist
Respondents infer researchers are either social
scientist or personality psychologist from the
affiliation or the letterhead, and attempt to
make their answers relevant to the goals of
researcher.
Wanke (2002) Reference group –
“students” vs. “population
at large”
Reference behavior –
“Leisure activities” vs.
“cultural activities”
Lower frequency report of going to
movies when reference group is
students; Lower frequency report of
going to movies when survey introduced
as assessing leisure activities
Respondents make use of the reference persons
and reference behaviors given in the survey as
a base for comparison
Winkielman,
Knauper, and
Schwarz (1998)
Reference period – “Anger”
during
“last year” vs. “last week”
More frequent and less severe episodes
of anger reported when question
pertained to one week than one year.
Shorter inference period implies survey
researcher interested in more frequent and less
severe episodes of anger
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Respondents may also rely on the maxim of relation in drawing inferences from 
the numerical values assigned to a rating scale.  Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler, Noelle-
Neumann, and Clark (1991) reported the first demonstration of this type of inference, 
showing that respondents came to different interpretations of the verbal end points of a 
scale when the scale labels ran from 0 to 10 than when it ran from –5 to 5.  Presuming 
that every piece of information was relevant, respondents inferred that the same end label 
(“Not at all successful”) meant the “mere absence of noteworthy success” when 0 was 
assigned to that scale point, but “the presence of failure” when –5 was assigned to the 
scale point (Schwarz, Knauper, et al., 1991).  As a result, respondents were less likely to 
select values less than or equal to the midpoint with the -5 to 5 scale labels than with the 
0 to 10 labels.  This finding is replicated on questions about different topics in four other 
studies (Haddock & Carrick, 1999; O’Muircheartaigh, Gaskell, & Wright, 1995; Schwarz, 
Grayson, & Knäuper, 1998; Schwarz & Hippler, 1995).  The experiment reported by 
O’Muircheartaigh et al. was part of a large-scale face-to-face survey.  The experiment 
reported by Schwarz, Grayson, and Knäuper involved a unipolar frequency scale and 
contrasted 0 to 10 and 1 to 11 scales.  
 The visual appearance of a rating scale can influence respondents’ interpretation 
of the scale as well.  Smith (1995), in a non-experimental study, noted that respondents 
seemed to draw inferences from the shape of the rating scale when asked to place 
themselves in the social hierarchy.  When the scale was presented in a shape of pyramid 
with the bottom wider than the middle and the top, respondents inferred that the scale 
conveyed the distribution by class that the researchers had in mind and that more people 
should be included at the bottom than in the middle (Smith, 1995).  This same result was 
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observed in an experiment by Schwarz, Grayson, and Knauper (1998, Experiment 2) 
among US college students, who were asked to evaluate their academic performance on 
either a stacked-box scale, a pyramid scale, or an onion-like scale (with the widest 
categories in the middle).  The different physical displays of the scales affected the 
response distributions in the predicted way (Schwarz, Grayson, & Knauper, 1998). 
Frequency scales provide other examples in which respondents apply the maxim 
of relation to derive pragmatic implicatures about the questions (Schwarz & Hippler, 
1991).  Respondents assume that the scale the researchers present in the questionnaire is 
meaningful and reflects the researchers’ knowledge about the population distribution of 
the behavior in question (Schwarz ,1996; Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985).  
Values in the middle range of the scale are assumed to reflect the “average” or “typical” 
behavior, whereas the extremes of the scale are assumed to correspond to the extremes of 
the distribution (Schwarz, 1996).  
Respondents may interpret ambiguous questions based on this assumption.  For 
instance, when asked to indicate how frequently they were “really irritated” recently, 
respondents inferred that ‘irritation’ meant minor annoyances when they were given a 
high frequency response scale, but severe annoyances when presented a low frequency 
scale (Schwarz, Strack, Muller, & Chassein 1988).  Another study by Gaskell, 
O’Muircheartaigh, and Wright (1994) made the same point – respondents rely on the 
frequency range of the response alternatives to comprehend the meaning of vague events 
rather than relying solely on the wording of the question.  
The range of response alternatives may have a strong impact on the estimated 
frequency of one’s own and others’ behaviors as well.  As Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, 
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and Strack argue (1985), everyday behaviors are not always represented in memory as 
distinct episodes, but rather as a blended, generic representation.  Accordingly, 
respondents often answer questions about the overall numbers of a given behavior (e.g., 
visits to an ATM) by estimating the frequency rather than recalling and counting each 
episode (Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996).  Applying the relation maxim in this 
context, respondents consider the range of the response options relevant to the question 
asked and use it as a frame of reference for their estimate (Schwarz, 1996; Schwarz, 
Hippler, et al., 1985).  The study by Schwarz and colleagues, for example, observed 
higher frequency estimates with scales that presented higher rather than lower frequency 
response alternatives (Schwarz and Bienias, 1990; Schwarz, Hippler, et al., 1985; 
Schwarz & Scheuring, 1988; see also Tourangeau & Smith 1996).  The same pattern was 
also observed in a cross-cultural setting (Ji, Schwarz, & Nisbett, 2001).  Both American 
and Chinese respondents made use of the range of response alternatives to estimate the 
frequency of unobservable behaviors (such as telling a lie).  Chinese respondents relied 
less on the response alternatives to estimate observable behaviors (Ji, Schwarz, & Nisbett, 
2001).  This finding is important in that it demonstrated the pervasiveness of the CP and 
maxims across cultures.   
In addition to influencing respondents’ behavioral reports, the range of the 
response alternatives can also affect subsequent comparative judgments (Schwarz, 
Hippler, et al., 1985; Schwarz & Scheuring, 1988; Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991).  Because 
the scale values are assumed to reflect the distribution of the behavior in question, the 
selection of a response is equivalent to locating oneself in the distribution.  Respondents 
subsequently use these inferences about their relative positions within the population in 
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making later judgments (Schwarz, 1996).  For instance, respondents in the Schwarz, 
Hippler, et al. (1985) study reported that television played a more important role in their 
leisure time when they had chosen an answer from the low rather than the high frequency 
scale, since this scale makes it look as if they were above average in their TV viewing.  
This effect of the scale range on comparative judgments has been replicated across other 
behaviors and judgments.   
Other features of the questions, such as the length of the period covered, the 
reference group, or reference behaviors given in the question text – even the letterhead on 
which the questionnaire is printed with the researchers’ affiliations – can trigger the 
maxim of relation, affecting the inferences respondents draw about the researchers’ 
intended meanings (Norenzayan & Schwarz, 1999; Wanke, 2002; Winkielman, Knauper, 
& Schwarz, 1998).  For instance, a question that covers a long reference period may 
imply that the events must be memorable.  The impact of the relation maxim also is 
apparent in some psychological experiments concerning base-rate information utilization 
and attribution errors (Krosnick, Li, & Lehman, 1990; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & 
Naderer, 1991). 
 
1.3.4 Web Surveys 
The studies reviewed so far were done either in self-administered or face-to-face 
surveys.  With developments in computer technology, newer data collection methods 
such as web surveys are gaining popularity among survey researchers.  Compared to the 
traditional modes for conducting surveys, web surveys can impart information through a 
richer range of media; picture images, hyperlinks, and video clips can be easily 
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embedded in a web survey, even though it is not yet clear whether these rich media are 
more likely to help or to confuse respondents.   
Couper, Tourangeau, and Kenyon (2004) make a distinction between task and 
style elements in web surveys (2004, p. 256-257).  Task elements are those that are 
essential to the task of completing the survey and include the question wording, the 
response options, instructions, navigational cues, and other essential material.  Typically, 
the task elements are verbal, though they can also be visual.  By contrast, the style 
elements refer to those features of the instrument that are incidental or completely 
unrelated to the task of answering the question (at least from the viewpoint of the survey 
designers).  They include the elements that create the overall appearance of the web site 
or survey instrument, the typeface used to represent the survey questions, the background 
color, and so on.  Style elements are typically but not necessarily visual.   
Some elements intended only as style elements can affect survey responses to web 
questions.  For example, Couper, Traugott, and Lamias (2001) reported a web survey of 
University of Michigan students, in which the width of a numeric entry box was 
inadvertently varied.  A random subset of respondents received a longer box than was 
necessary for the task.  They found that respondents were guided by the size of the entry 
box and provided more information than was required (Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 
2001).  Respondents gave longer answers such as “between 4 and 5” to the longer entry 
box instead of providing a numeric value (e.g., 5).  The length of the box had a 
significant effect on the content of answers provided (Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001).  
In another web survey, Couper, Tourangeau, and Kenyon (2004) examined the 
effect of presenting pictures on responses to behavioral frequency questions.  They 
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embedded in the survey 1) a picture of a salient but low frequency instance of the 
behavior in question (e.g., a picture of a department store in a question about shopping), 2) 
a picture of a less salient but higher frequency instance (a picture of a grocery store) , 3) 
both pictures, or 4) neither picture.  Relying on the maxim of relation, respondents used 
the picture to interpret the type of behaviors covered in the questions.  Accordingly, the 
picture showing the high frequency instance of the categories prompted higher reporting 
on the average than the picture showing the low frequency instance (Couper, Tourangeau, 
& Kenyon, 2004).   
The two studies by Couper and his colleagues seem to demonstrate that web 
surveys are not immune to the Gricean effects observed in the more traditional modes of 
administration.  Respondents appear to apply Grice’s maxims whether they are 
conducting a daily conversation or doing a survey, and whether the survey is online or 
offline.    
Summary.  To sum up, many incidental features of the questionnaire (even 
survey research setting itself) can affect respondents in unanticipated ways; seemingly 
incidental features can produce implicatures that affect respondents’ interpretation of the 
questions, and, subsequently, their responses.  The overlap in meaning between items, the 
items’ sequencing, the numerical range of the response alternatives, and the range and 
labeling of ratings scales can all produce implicatures about the survey designers’ intent 
in asking the questions, and these in turn shape the way respondents think about and 
answer the questions (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). 
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1.3.5 Conclusions 
Schwarz’s insight that Grice’s CP and his maxims apply in survey interviews is 
ground-breaking in that it points to an additional source of measurement error in surveys.  
Survey researchers generally intend for their questions to be taken literally.  Features 
other than the question text are thought to be peripheral and used out of convenience.  
They are, in the terms of Couper and his colleagues, style elements (Couper, Tourangeau, 
& Kenyon, 2004).  Survey respondents, however, being cooperative communicators 
themselves, try their best to understand and to answer the questions.  They often seem to 
read between lines and to find meaning in every feature of the question.  As a result, the 
question respondents attempt to answer might turn out to be different from the one the 
researchers intended to ask.  This mismatch or gap in understanding that influences 
respondents’ responses to questions and leads to measurement error.  
Schwarz (1998, 2000) presents three alternatives for surveys to take these Gricean 
effects into account.  We can 1) reliably create many biases by flouting conversational 
norms; 2) reliably attenuate such biases by undermining the assumption that the survey 
designers are cooperative communicators; or 3) avoid such biases by being cooperative 
communicators in the first place.  
Obviously the last two alternatives are the only way to reduce or eliminate 
response biases.  However, as Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski (2000) point out, there are 
many properties associated with each survey item and respondents cannot attend to (and 
misinterpret) all of them.  So the question is how we can predict which elements of a 
question will produce a Gricean effect.  At this point, we don’t know enough about the 
mechanisms underlying these effects and don’t have a good basis for prediction.  We 
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need systematic studies that provide direct evidence of the operation of the Cooperative 
Principle and the associated maxims in the survey research setting.  
 
1.4 Outline of Dissertation 
 This dissertation extends research on Gricean effects in surveys, with a focus on 
obtaining direct evidence of respondents’ inferences based on Grice’s maxims.  The 
remainder of the dissertation consists of four chapters.  Chapter 2 looks into the maxim of 
relation and the effects of physical arrangement of survey questions on web pages.  
Providing self-evident definitions to everyday terms in a survey questionnaire would 
seem to violate the maxim of manner; Chapter 3 describes a study examining the 
consequences of including such definitions.  Chapter 4 describes four experiments 
embedded in one web study; these experiments examine the maxims of relation, quantity, 
and quality, and their effects on measurement errors arising from web surveys.  The final 
chapter of the dissertation summarizes the findings, discusses their implications and the 
limitations of the research.  
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Chapter 2 The Maxim of Relation and Question Presentation in Web Surveys 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior studies have established that many incidental features of survey questions 
can affect respondents’ answers and create response errors (Schwarz, 1996, 1999).  The 
present study explores a formal feature of web survey questions – the physical 
arrangement of the questions on the web page – and its effects on respondents’ inferences 
about the meaning of the questions.   
Survey questions can be presented one question per screen (the interactive format 
for web questionnaires; see Couper, 2000) or questions can be shown on a single HTML 
page (the scrollable format).  A key difference between interactive and scrollable web 
surveys is that in the latter respondents can browse the entire survey before answering a 
single question.  Scrollable web surveys are very similar to mail surveys, while dynamic 
web surveys are comparable to interviewer-administered surveys in that they do not allow 
respondents to read ahead.  The different formats may have different implications for 
measurement error.  For instance, Dillman and Bowker (2001) argued that interactive 
web surveys result in a lack of context for the questions and could enhance order effects 
since respondents are not able to see the entire survey.  
If multiple questions are presented on the same screen, they can be presented in a 
grid (or matrix) or as a series of individual items (Graf, 2002).  With the grid format, 
many questions, which usually share the same answer categories, are positioned in a 
table.  The question text is located in the far left-hand column of the table, and the answer 
categories fill the columns to the right-hand edge of the screen.   
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From the survey researchers’ point of view, the physical arrangement of the 
questions is a style element; the decisions on which one to use are more likely to be 
driven by considerations of space, cost, and convenience.  However, this style element is 
also a formal feature that may be viewed as a task element by the respondents, leading to 
interpretive errors.   
For instance, one of the interpretive heuristics used by web respondents (see, 
Tourangeau, Couper, & Conrad, 2004) – the “Near Means Related” heuristic – may lead 
them to expect items that are physically near each other on the screen to be closely 
related conceptually.  As a result, respondents will see stronger similarities among items 
that are displayed on a single screen than among those displayed on separate screens, 
boosting the correlations among them.  Tourangeau and his colleagues presented eight 
related items either on eight separate screens (“interactive” presentation), on two screens 
with four questions on each screen in a grid (i.e., two grids on two separate screens), or in 
a single grid on one screen (Tourangeau, Couper, & Conrad, 2004).  Respondents were 
randomly assigned to one of the three presentation conditions.  The study found higher 
intercorrelations among the items when they were in a grid on one screen than when they 
were spread across two screens or presented on eight separate screens (Tourangeau, 
Couper, & Conrad, 2004).  In addition, Tourangeau and his colleagues found evidence 
that respondents inferred more similarity among the items than was warranted when the 
items were in a single grid; respondents were more prone to select the same answers for 
the eight items and were less sensitive to the fact that two of them were actually reverse-
worded when the eight items were in a single grid (Tourangeau, Couper, & Conrad, 
2004).   
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A second web study offered further support that the grouping of related items on a 
single screen is likely to lead respondents to view the items as more strongly related, 
increasing the correlation among them (Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001).  In their 
second experiment, Couper and his colleagues varied the physical presentation of a group 
of questions by displaying them either in a grid on one screen (the ‘multi-item screen’ 
condition in the paper) or on separate screens (the ‘single-item screen’ condition).  As 
expected, the inter-item correlations were consistently higher in the multi-item screen 
condition than in the single-item screen condition.  However, the overall effect was not 
large, and none of the differences between each pair of correlations reach statistical 
significance (Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001).   
Reips (2002) also examined the impact of the grouping of items by screens on 
respondents’ answers to earlier items in a web survey.  He displayed two items asking 
respondents’ potential expenditures on donations and on the Internet connection either on 
one or two screens.  Respondents tended to allocate more of their income to the first item 
than to the second item when the two items were presented on separate pages; however, 
when the two questions were displayed on the same page, respondents allocated more of 
their income to the second item than to the first (Reips, 2002).  
Even though it is hard to say what pragmatic implicatures were generated in 
Reips’ study, all three studies suggest that the physical arrangement of survey questions 
in a web survey provides cues to respondents, affecting their comprehension of the 
questions.  Respondents take the style element of arrangement on screen as a task 
element.   
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I varied the physical arrangement of a set of six questions in a web survey.  The 
survey presented the six items in one of the three ways: 1) one question per screen; 2) all 
six on the same screen; or 3) in a grid on a single screen.  Unlike the studies by 
Tourangeau et al. (2004) and Couper et al. (2004), the six items in this study may not 
seem related at first sight, even though they shared the same theme (risky behaviors).  
Nonetheless, if respondents regarded the physical arrangement as meaningful, they would 
infer the strongest relation among the items when they were presented in a grid regardless 
of the content of the questions.  This is especially true when the items were embedded in 
a multiple-page web survey.  To respondents, it is natural to infer that the survey 
designers put the items together in a grid or on a single screen because they are related – 
why else would they be grouped together?  Accordingly, I predicted that respondents 
would infer greater relatedness among the items when they were displayed in a single 
grid and that their answers would show higher intercorrelations than when the items were 
presented in other formats.   
This experiment also varied the introduction to the items.  One introduction – the 
facilitating introduction – indicated that the questions were taken from the same source 
(thus, encouraging respondents to apply Grice’s maxim of relation); a second 
introduction – the inhibitory introduction – indicated that the items came from different 
sources so as to discourage the application of the relation maxim.  The third introduction 
was intended to be neutral and didn’t reveal anything about the relatedness (or 
unrelatedness) of the questions.  The purpose of the introduction variable was to see 
whether the verbal introduction might strengthen or override the inference from the 
physical arrangement of the survey questions.   
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2.2 Method 
Overview. The data came from a web survey conducted by MSInteractive.  
Survey Sampling Inc. (SSI) selected the sample for the web survey, using two different 
frames – the Survey Spot frame and the America Online Opinion Place.  The Survey Spot 
frame includes more than a million web users who have signed up to receive survey 
invitations.  SSI selected 29,772 email addresses for the survey and sent out email 
messages inviting the recipients to take part in “a study of attitudes and lifestyle.”  The 
email invitations included the URL of the web site with our questionnaire and a unique 
ID number (which prevented respondents from completing the survey more than once).  
A total of 1,361 respondents completed the survey for a response rate of 5% (AAPOR 
[2000] RR1).   
The America Online Opinion Place provides access to approximately 25 million 
AOL account holders, which is estimated to include about 50 million individuals 
worldwide.  Opinion Place uses a technique in which survey invitations are posted on 
banners throughout the AOL service and related sites.  Users willing to click through are 
screened against the respondent requirements for active surveys and then passed through 
to a survey for which they qualify.  Respondents who complete a survey accrue miles in 
the American Airlines AAdvantage Program.  This sampling technique makes it 
impossible to compute a response rate.  The study was fielded from November 5, 2004, 
through November 14, 2004, and included questions on a range of topics such as health, 
diet, and travel.  Since my goal is not generalization to a population but rather analysis of 
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differences between experimental treatments, all the analyses were done on unweighted 
data from both sample sources.  A total of 2,587 respondents completed the survey.1
Experimental manipulation. The experiment employed a 3 (physical 
arrangement of the survey questions) by 3 (introductions) factorial design.  Crossing the 
physical arrangement and introduction variables produced the nine experimental 
conditions in Table 2.1 (see Table 2.2 for exact wording of the three introductions).  
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the nine conditions.  Table 2.1 also shows 
the number of completed cases in each cell of the design.2
Table 2.1.   Number of Completed Cases Per Experimental Condition 
 One Question per 
Screen 
All On One 
Screen 
In a 
Grid 
 
Total 
Facilitating Introduction 304 269 248 821 
Neutral Introduction 293 280 273 846 
Inhibiting Introduction  298 316 306 920 
Total 895 865 827 2,587 
Target questions. A set of six questions asked respondents about various risky 
behaviors (see Table 2.2. for exact wording).  The questions ranged from whether the 
respondents wore seatbelts to whether they would use the sunscreen if they stayed in the 
sun for more than an hour to whether they took fruits everyday.  On first sight, the six 
questions might not be very related, even though the questions were all about risky 
behaviors.  
Follow-up questions. Three follow-up questions were intended to assess
respondents’ inferences about the relatedness of the six target questions.  One question 
1 I analyzed the data by sample and found no noteworthy differences in the results. 
2 For approximately half of the respondents, this experiment was placed in the middle of the survey. For the 
other half, it came in the front part of the survey. However, the location didn’t change the results and I 
ignore this variable in the analyses below. Another manipulation has to do with the response categories of 
the target items. Half of the respondents had same response categories for all six target items, while the 
other half got different response categories. Again, the analyses below ignore this variable, which had no 
noticeable effects.  
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asked respondents to rate the relatedness of the target questions on a seven-point scale. 
The other two questions asked respondents what the six target questions were about (see 
Table 2.2 for exact wording). 
Table 2.2. Experiment 1: Introductions, Target Items and Follow-up Questions
Introduction 
Facilitating Introduction: The following questions are taken from a standardized psychological 
battery that measures a person’s tendency to take risky behaviors. 
Neutral Introduction: Here are a few more questions for you… 
Inhibitory Introduction: The following questions were selected from our database of questions 
from different online surveys about lifestyles. 
Target Items 
Same Response Categories Different Response Categories 
Do you always use seatbelts when you drive or 
ride in a car, van, sports utility vehicle (SUV), or 
pick-up? 
How often do you use seatbelts when you 
drive or ride in a car, van, sports utility 
vehicle (SUV), or pick-up?  
Between not having medical insurance and buying 
medical insurance with your own money, would 
you opt for not having a medical insurance? 
Between not having medical insurance and 
buying medical insurance with your own 
money, which one would you opt for? 
When you ride a bicycle, do you always wear a 
helmet? 
When you ride a bicycle, do you always 
wear a helmet? 
Do you think it is safe to keep a firearm in or 
around your house? 
Do you think it is safe to keep a firearm in 
or around your house? 
Do you always use sunscreen of SPF 15 or greater 
when you go out in the sun for more than 1 hour? 
How often do you use sunscreen of SPF 15 
or greater when you go out in the sun for 
more than 1 hour?  
Not counting juice, do you eat fruit every day? Not counting juice, do you eat fruit every 
day? 
Follow-up Questions 
Without looking back, what was your impression of the items on the last six screens/last screen? 
What do you think these six items were about? (Open-ended) 
Would you say that the 6 items are about…. 
 1 Recreational activities  
 2 Risky behaviors  
 3 Life styles 
 4 American culture 
 5 Medical care 
 6 Some other topics 
Sometimes surveys ask questions about closely related topics, but other times they shift from one 
unrelated topic to the next. Again, based on your impression of the last six items on the last six 
screens/last screen, how much were the items related? 
1 = Very closely related              
7 = Not at all related 
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2.3 Results  
 My main hypotheses involved the correlations among responses by experimental 
condition and the inferences respondents derived about the relation among the items.  
However, I checked the survey answers by conditions first.  
Survey responses. To examine whether responses varied by experimental 
condition, I computed a risk score for every respondent based on their responses to the 
six target questions.  A two-way ANOVA on the risk scores showed that the risk scores 
didn’t vary by experimental condition.  Neither the main effects nor the interaction of the 
two experimental factors had significant impact on risk scores.  
Intercorrelations. I predicted that the highest intercorrelations would be 
observed in the grid condition and when the respondents got the facilitating introduction.  
The lowest intercorrelations should occur when the items were spread across six screens 
and when the respondents got the inhibitory introduction.  I computed the Cronbach’s 
alpha among the six items across nine experimental conditions.  Figure 2.1 presents the 
alphas by experimental condition.  Neither the main effect of the physical arrangement 
nor the interaction was significant, though the main effect of the introduction was 
marginally significant (F(2,V )=2.39, p<.10).  
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Figure 2.1. Plots of Cronbach’s Alphas by Experimental Condition 
 
Only the neutral introduction shows the hypothesized trend with the highest 
intercorrelations in the grid condition, followed by the same screen condition, and the 
separate screen condition (see the dotted lines in Figure 2.1).  A X2 test of the linear trend 
is marginally significant (X2(2)=4.65, p=.098), showing that the alphas are significantly 
different across the three physical arrangement conditions under the neutral introduction 
condition.  This replicates the pattern reported by Tourangeau et al. (2004) and Couper et 
al. (2001).  The same tests done for the facilitating and the inhibitory introduction 
conditions didn’t yield significant differences across physical layouts.   
 The spread of the alphas across different introductions is largest under the grid 
condition; the X2 test of the differences across the three correlations is highly significant 
(X2(2)=9.23, p<.001).  Respondents seemed to be affected more by the introductions 
when the questions are laid out in a grid.  However, the direction of this effect is contrary 
to my hypothesis.  It seems that the facilitating introduction backfired, appreciably 
lowering the correlations among the items.  This is surprising at the first sight.  However, 
careful examination of the literature shows it might be reasonable.   
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Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz (1996, p.122) pointed out that a conversational 
norm of nonredundancy (i.e., the maxim of quantity) may be invoked when related 
questions are perceived as belonging to the same conversational context.  Among the 
variables that could trigger the norm of nonredundancy are the introductions to a group of 
related items.  Schwarz, Strack, and Mai (1991) showed the importance of joint lead-in at 
triggering the application of the maxim of quantity, and Strack and his colleagues showed 
that presenting two questions in a single box – thus emphasizing their relatedness – 
elicited contrast effects (Strack, Schwarz, & Wanke, 1991).  An earlier study, by Metzner 
and Mann (1953), demonstrated that the correlations among questions grouped together 
under a caption stating the topic, were smaller than those correlations among same 
questions when they were interspersed among questions on other topics almost as often 
as they were larger.  Grouping questions about a subject does not invariably increase the 
correlations among the questions (Metzner & Mann, 1953). 
In this study, then, when the introduction revealed nothing about the relatedness 
of the questions, the formal feature – i.e., arrangement of the questions in the grid – led 
respondents to infer that the questions were conceptually related, and higher 
intercorrelations were obtained.  However, when the introduction told the respondents 
that the items were related, creating a shared conversational context, it seemed to trigger 
the maxim of quantity, leading respondents to look for distinctions among the items; as a 
result, the intercorrelations were much lower.  
Inferences. I hypothesized that if respondents applied the maxim of relation, they 
would infer the strongest relation among the items when the items were presented in a 
grid, the next strongest when the items were on the same screen, and the weakest relation 
39
when the items were spread across six separate screens.  Furthermore, the facilitating 
introduction would reinforce the perception of relatedness while the inhibitory 
introduction would reduce it.  I assessed respondents’ inferences about the relation 
among the six items with a follow-up question administered after the six target 
questions.3 The follow-up question asked respondents to rate how related the six items 
were on a rating scale that ranged from 1 (“Very closely related”) to 7 (“Not at all 
related”).  I reverse coded the question so that higher numbers mean greater perceived 
relatedness.  Figure 2.2 plots the mean perceived relatedness rating by experimental 
conditions.  Neither the main effects nor the interaction is significant in a 2-way ANOVA 
of the means.  
Figure 2.2.   Mean Perceived Relatedness Rating by Experimental Condition 
 
Contrary to my hypothesis, none of the lines exhibited the linear trend as 
hypothesized.  It seems that the formal feature – the physical arrangement of the survey 
 
3 The answers to the other two follow-up questions that asked respondents what the six target items were 
about were not reported here because the facilitating introduction contained a key phrase “risky behavior,” 
which influenced answers to these two questions (the same phrase was even included as a response 
alternative to the closed-end question). Thus, more respondents given the facilitating introduction listed or 
chose ‘risky behaviors’ in their answers to both questions, creating an artificial significant main effect of 
the introduction variable. The physical arrangement of questions didn’t have a significant main effect on 
responses to either question; neither did the interaction.   
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questions – didn’t trigger the inference of relatedness as hypothesized.  In addition, the 
introduction variable did not strengthen (or suppress) the inference effectively.   
 
2.4 Conclusions  
This experiment manipulated the physical arrangement of a set of six questions by 
presenting them one item per screen, all on the same screen, or in a grid on one screen.  
Contrary to the hypotheses, the visual cue of a grid did not lead respondents to see the 
items as more strongly related; they tended (nonsignificantly) to rate the items as least 
related when the items were displayed in a grid.  On the other hand, the grid condition 
produced the highest intercorrelations (measured by Cronbach’s alphas) among the six 
items, partially replicating the previous research on the effects of physical arrangement 
(see Couper et al., 2001; Tourangeau et al., 2004).  However, the pattern for the 
intercorrelations by the physical arrangement of the items depended on introductions I 
gave respondents.  When the introduction did not mention anything about the relatedness 
or unrelatedness of the items, the alphas followed the hypothesized trend – the highest 
intercorrelations were observed in the grid condition, the second highest in the same 
screen condition, and the lowest in the one item per screen condition.  A different picture 
emerged when the introduction told the respondents that the items were related or 
unrelated.  For the facilitating introduction in particular, the grid condition seemed to 
serve as a shared conversational context and invoked the maxim of quantity.  
Respondents seemed to make a distinction among the items rather than regarding them as 
related; this matches the findings by Strack and his colleagues (Strack et al., 1991).  The 
reaction time data also suggested a switch of maxims – respondents were slower when 
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given a facilitating introduction (mean response time=51.7 seconds) than when given a 
neutral introduction (48.0 seconds) or an inhibitory introduction (49.1 seconds), though 
the difference didn’t approach significance (F(2,824)=1.38, p=.25).   
The differential effect of introductions on the correlations in the grid condition is 
worth further investigation.  Although this particular experiment failed to produce 
conclusive evidence, we should be more careful about using grids since they may 
encourage respondents to exaggerate the similarities or discrepancies among a set of 
related items, depending on the introductions given.  In addition, in the neutral 
introduction condition, the marginally significant differences in the correlations among 
target items across physical layouts should alert us to the different performance in the 
grid and the same screen conditions.  The two physical layout conditions are similar in 
that respondents were able to read the whole set of questions before answering.  
However, the correlations obtained from these two layouts were not similar.  This 
suggests that respondents draw different inferences drawn from the layouts.  
On the whole, this experiment didn’t bear out the hypotheses regarding the effects 
of the physical arrangements of survey questions and the introductions on correlations.  
The inference obtained didn’t show convincingly that respondents applied the maxim of 
relation (or the “near means related” heuristic in Tourangeau et al., 2004).  One possible 
reason that respondents’ inferences from the physical layout of the questions were not in 
the hypothesized direction is that the follow-up question I used to capture respondents’ 
inferences was flawed.  Although I tried to balance the wording of the follow-up item 
(see Table 2.2 for the exact wording), the question “how much were the items related?” 
may carry the presupposition that the items are related (cf. Knauper, 1998; Sterngold, 
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Warland, & Herrmann, 1994; see Chapter 4 of this dissertation).  In addition, the 
presupposition might carry a stronger weight under the one-item-per-screen condition.  
This layout is the default for web surveys and it may not carry any implication about the 
relatedness of the items; as a result, the respondents may give the question presupposition 
a greater weight.  The fact that average responses to this relatedness question were above 
the scale midpoint – a rating of 4 – in all conditions (see Figure 2.2) is consistent with 
this speculation.  
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Chapter 3 The Maxim of Manner and Providing Definitions 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 According to the survey response process framework, survey responding starts 
with comprehension of survey questions (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  
Incorrect understanding of survey questions will affect – directly or indirectly – the 
retrieval of relevant information, the estimation and judgment strategies used, and even 
the mapping of an answer to one of the response options (Conrad & Schober, 2000; 
Schober & Conrad, 1997).  Survey researchers have known for some time that, despite 
their best attempts to write clear questions, respondents have problems comprehending 
survey questions (Belson, 1981; Conrad & Schober, 2000; Fowler, 1992; Schober & 
Conrad, 1997).  
 There are at least two types of comprehension problems, both of which may affect 
the validity of the survey data.  First of all, different respondents may interpret the same 
question very differently.  In a well-known study, Belson (1981) showed that respondents 
vary in their interpretation of even simple words such as “you.”  For instance, while 
84.6% of the respondents believed that the term “you” referred to the individual alone, 
1.9% thought it meant the individual and his family.  For another 3.8% of respondents, 
“you” was the individual and the spouse.  The other 3.8% considered “you” as a 
combination of the individual plus at least one other family member.  What is more 
alarming is that 5.8% of respondents simply overlooked the term (Belson, 1981).  Such a 
lack of consensus on the meaning of key survey terms (and survey questions as a whole) 
could lead to systematic variations, affecting the comparability of data across respondents, 
particularly if the differences of interpretation are large and coincide with boundaries of 
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subgroups defined by culture, race, age or other characteristics (Martin, Campanelli, & 
Fay, 1991).  It could also reduce survey researchers’ ability to reach valid conclusions 
about relationships based on the data because of the error in measurement (see Fuller, 
1987, on the effects of measurement error on regression coefficients and other statistics).  
 Second, respondents could be answering based on the same interpretation of the 
question, but one that does not fit the survey researchers’ definitions.  Respondents’ 
interpretations may disagree with a survey definition by either being too broad or too 
narrow compared with the meaning intended in the survey.  Suessbrick, Schober, and 
Conrad (2000) reported, for instance, that about 46% of respondents considered 
“smoking” in the first question in the Tobacco Use Supplement to the Current Population 
Survey (“Have you smoked at least 100 cigarettes in your entire life?”) as “only puffs 
inhaled,” whereas the survey’s definition included all puffs, whether inhaled or not.  Such 
a difference between respondents’ interpretations and survey’s definitions could 
contribute to bias in the survey estimates.  
Both variability across respondents and systematic misinterpretation jeopardize 
survey quality.  Offering respondents definitions to clarify unclear or ambiguous terms is 
one possible solution.  There is empirical evidence that providing definitions helps 
improve respondents’ comprehension.  For example, Fowler (1992) revised seven 
questions from health surveys conducted by government agencies or academic survey 
organizations by offering definitions to clarify unclear terms.  He found that the revised 
questions improved comprehension; the rates of requests for clarification and rates of 
inadequate answers declined (Fowler, 1992).   
45
Similarly, Conrad and Schober demonstrated that uniformity of interpretation – 
and thus data quality – could be increased dramatically when respondents are provided 
with clarification about the meaning of the words in the questions (Conrad & Schober, 
2000; Schober & Conrad, 1997; Schober, Conrad, & Fricker, 1999; Suessbrick, Schober, 
& Conrad, 2000).  For instance, Schober and Conrad (1997) showed that allowing 
interviewers to provide definitions when the questions involved complicated mapping – 
that is, when the respondents’ situations didn’t map to the key terms in the questions in a 
straightforward way – greatly improved the accuracy of responses (87%) relative to 
interviewers who were not allowed to provide definitions (27% accuracy).   
In another study, Conrad and Schober (2000) compared response changes in a 
reinterview due to different interviewing techniques.  They observed that 22% of 
respondents changed their answers, on average, when the reinterview was conducted as a 
conversational interview in which interviewers provided definitions to respondents.  By 
contrast, only about half as many changes occurred when the second interview was still 
standardized.  
The existing research on the effects of definitions on survey responses has 
focused more on the mode of presenting definitions than on the content of the definitions 
themselves (see Tourangeau & Conrad, 2004, for an exception).  These earlier studies 
have examined such aspects of offering definitions as the trigger for providing definitions 
(a request from the respondent, the interviewers’ own initiative, or an automated feature 
in a web survey) and the  accessibility of definitions (always shown, shown when the 
respondent click or rollover, and so on) in web surveys (see, for example, Bloom & 
Schober, 1999; Conrad, Couper, Tourangeau, & Peytchev, in press;  Lind, Schober, & 
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Conrad, 2001; Schober, Conrad, & Bloom, 2000; Schober, Conrad, & Fricker, 1999).  
These studies uncovered some problems with offering definitions to respondents to 
improve comprehension of the question.   
One major problem is that respondents almost never requested or retrieved 
definitions either from the interviewer in interviewer-administered interviews or from the 
automated questionnaire in the web studies (Conrad, Couper, Tourangeau, & Peytchev, in 
press; Schober, Conrad, & Fricker, 1999; Suessbrick, Schober, & Conrad, 2000).  One 
likely reason that respondents rarely requested a definition is that it didn’t occur to the 
survey respondents (or the interviewers) that their interpretations of the questions might 
differ from anyone else's.  Respondents seem to be following a “presumption of 
interpretability” in responding to survey questions (Clark & Schober, 1992; Schwarz & 
Oyserman, 2001).  The presumption – which is operative in daily conversation – is that 
the utterance has been tailored to the listener and contains all the information needed to 
interpret it.    
The interpretability presumption is entailed by Grice’s Cooperative Principle, 
which requires speakers to contribute to the common conversational goal.  Listeners, for 
their part, assume that both what is said and how it is said are relevant to the 
conversational goal and critical to understanding.  In the survey setting, respondents 
assume that the survey researcher has chosen his wording so they will understand it as 
intended (Clark & Schober, 1992).  Thus, respondents assume that the most obvious 
meaning is likely to be the correct one, and if they cannot find an obvious meaning, they 
will look to the immediate context of the question to determine one.  
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A second problem with the alternative of offering definitions to respondents has 
to do with the effort required to access a definition.  If it requires much effort to access 
the definition, respondents are unlikely to bother (Conrad et al., in press).  Conrad and his 
colleagues showed that few respondents requested a definition if retrieving it required 
more than one mouse click.  This seems to lend support to the notion of “satisficing” 
(Krosnick, 1991) – respondents are unwilling to expend effort to achieve optimal 
responding.   
The existing work also shows an increased interview time on average when 
definitions are requested, retrieved, or consulted (Conrad et al., in press; Conrad & 
Schober, 2000; Schober & Conrad, 1997).  This seemed to provide further proof for the 
speculation that processing definitions requires efforts.  In combination of the second 
problem described above, it is unclear whether respondents would be willing to spend the 
efforts to process the definition carefully even if they did access it.   
Groves and his colleagues argue that there is a tension between explicitly defining 
terms in a question (in an attempt to eliminate ambiguity) and increasing the burden on 
the respondents to absorb the full intent of the question (Groves, Couper, Fowler, 
Lepkowski, Singer, & Tourangeau, 2004).  Similarly, Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 
(2000: Chapter 2) argue that attempts to clarify terms can lead to syntactically complex 
questions.  The trade-off involves the amount of information to give in a definition so that 
it clarifies meaning without seeming redundant or adding too much complexity.  
This tension becomes more acute when survey researchers define terms used 
everyday, terms such as “you,” “child,” “poultry,” and so on.  Defining terms that 
everyone already understands violates the maxim of manner (Grice, 1989).  That maxim 
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enjoins speakers to be brief, clear, and orderly, and to avoid unnecessary ambiguity and 
wordiness.  Violations of the Gricean maxim tend to generate conversational implicature 
– an inference listeners work out to maintain the overarching assumption that the speaker 
is being cooperative.  Defining everyday terms could suggest to respondents that the 
everyday terms in the survey questions are being used in some special or technical sense 
or that the definitions are intended for a subpopulation that needs them (e.g., non-native 
speakers).  These implicatures may give rise more confusion than clarification. 
Applied work in the field of computer-human interaction provides some empirical 
evidence for the confusions that can be caused by apparent violation of the Cooperative 
Principle.  Young (1999) compared instruction descriptions generated according to 
Grice’s CP to an “exhaustive plan,” which gives the most detailed (and most redundant) 
instructions on every single step of the task, and to a “primitive plan,” which describes 
only the lowest-level steps in the task.  In other words, the three instructions differed 
sharply in the amount of information they contained.  Subjects were asked to carry out a 
task described by the instructions within a computer simulation.  Young (1999) found 
that subjects given the instructions produced according to the CP committed fewer errors 
and achieved more of their top-level goals than subjects who got either of the other two 
sets of instructions.  Specifically, the “exhaustive plan” led to the highest failure rate 
compared to the other two (Young, 1999).  Giving more information than was necessary 
didn’t improve performance.   
A similar finding was reported by Gerber and her colleagues, who explored how 
to convey the notion of “residence” to respondents in an effort to improve the accuracy of 
their responses to roster questions like those used in the decennial census (Gerber, 
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Wellens, & Keeley, 1996).  Gerber and her coauthors found that providing definitional 
information about census rules on residence resulted in fewer correct answers for 
questions on simple and straightforward living situations.  In two of five instances of 
straightforward living arrangements, the decreases were fairly substantial (15-18% 
decreases in correct answers).  Gerber and her colleagues speculated that accuracy 
decreased because respondents regard the presentation of definitional rules which they 
already “know” as redundant; respondents may, as a result, reinterpret these rules in an 
effort to make sense of them (Gerber, Wellens, & Keeley, 1996). 
The findings of Young (1999) and Gerber et al. (1996) raise the question of how 
much information to include in a definition or a set of instructions.  This question is 
important since any definition can appear self-evident and redundant to those portions of 
the target population who share the same definition as the researcher.  It will become a 
bigger issue especially as surveys are designed to accommodate populations that vary 
more in these linguistic backgrounds.  
This study examines the potential costs of offering explicit definitions for 
everyday terms.  It focuses on the effects of offering definitions on comprehension and 
data quality when the definitions fail to provide new information to respondents.  This 
will often happen in practice since, for many respondents, their definitions of these terms 
will coincide with those of the survey.  For these respondents, the definitions will seem 
unnecessary, violating the maxims of manner.  The current study employs definitions that 
were designed not to provide new information.  
The main hypotheses concern three dependent variables – responses to the 
questions, the response times, and respondents’ inferences based on the definitions.  
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When respondents are offered self-evident definitions for everyday terms, I predict that 
they will recognize that the definitions aren’t necessary; accordingly, they will become 
confused, try to work out an inference to explain why a definition was provided, and 
shape their responses based on the inference.  I tested the following hypotheses:  
1) Giving a definition to an everyday term leads to different survey 
responses from when no definition is offered.  Specifically, the variance 
and covariance matrix for the items will differ. 
2) Respondents who are given unneeded definitions will take longer on 
average to arrive at an answer than those who are not offered the 
definitions.  
3) Respondents who are given definitions to everyday terms will infer that 
these terms are used in some technical sense or that the definitions are 
intended for some special population. 
 
3.2 Method 
Overview. The experiment was one of several experiments embedded in a 
questionnaire administered via audio computer-assisted self-interviewing (ACASI).  The 
questionnaire covered a range of topics, most of them political topics.  The questionnaire 
included several experiments; most of them involved response order.  We recruited 160 
participants from the College Park, Greenbelt, and Silver Spring, MD area.  We placed 
recruitment flyers at local libraries, advertised the study in local papers, and sent an e-
mail invitation to the staff and graduate students at the University of Maryland.  Since we 
desired a heterogeneous sample, we restricted the number of undergraduate students to 
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less than 40 (one fourth of the targeted number of completes).  Participants came to the 
Joint Program in Survey Methodology, where they first completed a 40-45 minute survey 
on a computer.  The questionnaire was programmed in Blaise.  Participants could listen to 
the questions (and response options) via earphones, read them displayed on the computer 
screen, or both.  As I note below, the speed of the voice reading the questions was 
systematically varied.  Participants indicated their answers by typing in the number 
corresponding to one of the answer options or by typing in text (in response to the open-
ended questions).  They then completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire assessing the 
“Big Five” personality traits as well as their need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984).  These questions took about 10 minutes.  Participants were paid $25 upon 
completion of two questionnaires.  The experiment ran from January 10, 2005, to 
February 28, 2005.  
Experimental manipulation. My experiment was placed in the middle part of 
the questionnaire.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions.  In one condition, redundant definitions for everyday terms were embedded in 
the question text and provided to participants for all four key survey terms (poultry, fat, 
vegetable, and red meat).  For example, here is the poultry item with its accompanying 
definition:  
“We will first ask you about how much poultry you eat.  We define poultry as 
domestic fowl raised for meat.  During the last 6 months, how much poultry did 
you typically consume?” 
 
In the other condition, participants were asked the same questions with the same key 
terms.  However, no definitions were given.  An example of the wording is given below: 
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“We are interested in studying Americans’ consumption of poultry.  We will first 
ask you about how much poultry you eat.  During the last 6 months, how much 
poultry did you typically consume?” 
 
The other experimental variable is related to the larger A-CASI study that 
included my experiment.  We used synthesized voices that permitted us to systematically 
vary the rate of speech.4 There were three speed conditions: slow speed, fast speed, and 
fast speed with pauses between the response options.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three speed conditions.  This randomization was independent of the 
random assignment to definition conditions.  Although this manipulation is not directly 
relevant to my experiment, some of my analyses control for voice speed.  Table 3.1 
summarizes the number of participants in the two (definition or no definition) by three 
(slow speed, fast speed, or fast speed with pauses) experimental design.  
Table 3.1. Number of Participants Assigned to Experimental Conditions 
 Given Definition No Definition Total 
Slow Speed 27 25 52 
Fast Speed 22 30 52 
Fast Speed with Pauses 26 30 56 
Total 75 85 160 
Target questions. Respondents were asked about four food categories (poultry, 
fat, vegetable, and red meat).  For each food category, respondents were asked about their 
typical consumption (e.g., “During the last 6 months, how much poultry did you typically 
consume?”) and whether they tried to consume or avoid that food category (e.g., 
“Thinking about the food you eat, is poultry something you actively try to include in your 
diet, something you actively try to avoid, or something you do not think about either 
way?”).  For some categories, the respondents were also asked to judge whether a 
 
4 The ACASI voice was a synthesized voice, generated by the AT&T Natural Voices® software, developed 
by AT&T Laboratories. 
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specific food belonged to that food category (e.g., “Do you consider Cornish hens to be 
poultry?”).   
 Follow-up questions. I assessed respondents’ inferences about the food 
categories with two follow-up questions.  The first asked respondents whom they thought 
the study was intended for and the second asked whether respondents believed these 
terms were used in a technical sense or their ordinary sense.  In addition, respondents also 
rated themselves on their diet consciousness and health consciousness along seven-point 
scales (where the endpoints were labeled).  
 
3.3 Results 
The analyses focus on three outcome variables – the interrelations among the 
responses, response times, and respondents’ inferences.  I begin my analyses with the 
effect of definitions on responses to the target questions.5
Effects on the responses. Providing self-evident definitions to everyday terms 
breaches the maxim of manner.  If respondents noticed the violation and used it to make 
an inference about the meaning of the questions, then their answers might be affected.  I 
first compared the variance in responses to the four key survey questions when 
definitions were offered versus when they were not.  Table 3.2 shows an apparent trend 
for smaller variances when definitions were offered than when they were not offered.  F-
tests showed that providing definitions significantly reduced the variance for two of the 
four target questions (consumption of poultry and consumption of red meat).  The 
 
5 Answers to the 14 target questions didn’t vary by whether self-evident definitions were offered or not.  
Responses to one (out of 14) question were affected significantly by voice condition. The two experimental 
factors had significant interaction effects on responses to two other questions.  
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reduction in variance indicates only that responses were more uniform across respondents; 
without true values to compare the answers to, it is hard to tell whether the reduction in 
variance also represents a reduction in measurement error.  
Table 3.2.   Variances of Responses to Four Target Questions By Definition Condition 
Definitions 
offered 
Definitions not 
offered 
 
F values 
Consumption of poultry 0.488 0.853 F(74,84)=1.75, p=.01 
Consumption of fat 0.907 0.727 F(84,74)=1.24, p=.16 
Consumption of vegetable 0.728 0.766 F(74,84)=1.05, p=.41 
Consumption of red meat 0.916 1.333 F(74,84)=1.46, p=.05 
I also looked at whether the definitions helped respondents classify borderline 
instances of a category.  I asked respondents about three borderline instances—whether 
eggs are poultry; whether potatoes are vegetables; and whether ham is red meat.  I also 
asked about more prototypical exemplars of the target categories – Cornish hen, broccoli, 
and steak – and nearly everyone classified these correctly with or without a definition.  
For the borderline instances, responses were somewhat evenly divided (see Table 3.3).  
The definitions didn’t systematically move respondents either way.  Furthermore, the 
definitions didn’t significantly influence the speed with which respondents responded to 
the questions.  
Table 3.3.   Percentage of “Yes” Responses to Borderline Instances by Definition 
Condition 
 Given Definition (%) No Definition (%) X2 test results 
Eggs 34.1 46.0 X2=2.31 p=.13
Potatoes 63.5 61.3 X2=.08   p=.77
Ham 47.6 44.0 X2=.21   p=.64
For each of the four key target terms, I also examined the relation of responses to 
the target question and several related questions.  I fit multiple regression models with the 
target question as the dependent variable and the related questions as the predictors.  If 
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unnecessary definitions confuse respondents, their answers may be more error prone, 
reducing their correlation with the predictors.  Thus, the focus of these analyses is the 
interaction effects between the definition and the other predictors.  Table 3.4 displays the 
regression coefficients from the four multiple regressions.  The bolded estimates are 
significant at the \=.05 level.  The p values are given for marginally significant 
coefficient estimates, but not for non-significant estimates.  Overall, four out of the 24 
interactions between the predictors and the definition variable were significant, indicating 
that the definition altered the relation between the predictor and the target dietary 
consumption variable.  However, of the four significant interactions, two are positive and 
two are negative.  Thus, there didn’t seem to be a consistent trend as to the size and 
direction of the significant interaction effects.  Although giving definitions to everyday 
terms did have some effect on the underlying covariance matrix, these effects were 
neither consistent nor strong.   
Response times. I hypothesized that the total response time would be longer for 
respondents given definitions to the everyday terms than for those who didn’t get 
definitions.  We recorded the time from the moment the audio started to read the question 
until the moment when the respondent chose an answer.  Thus, our measure of the 
response time encompasses the reading time for the question by the audio plus the time 
respondents took to answer the question.  This measure poses a problem since the 
respondents’ actual response time is confounded with the voice speed for the audio.  The 
reaction times would almost necessarily be longer in the slow-speed voice condition than 
in the fast-speed voice conditions.  Table 3.5 presents the results.   
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Table 3.4. Regression Coefficients from Multiple Regression Models by Target Item 
 
Table 3.5. ANOVA Results on Total Response Time 
Voice Condition No Definition Given Definition
Slow speed 210.4 213.6 
Fast speed 177.3 178.2 
Fast speed with pauses 199.6 185.5 
ANOVA Results   
Definition F(1,154)=0.14 ns 
 Voice Condition F(2,154)=4.96 p=0.01 
 Interaction F(2,154)=0.39 ns 
Dependent Variable 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Consumption 
of Poultry 
(])
Consumption 
of Fat 
(])
Consumption 
of Vegetable 
(])
Consumption 
of Red Meat 
(])
Definition Main 
Effect 
1.86 
(p=.08) 
-0.52 -1.44 -3.63 
(p=.01) 
Consumption 
of poultry 
Interaction 
effect with 
definition 
--- -0.15 .031 0.37 
(p=.07) 
Consumption 
of fat 
Interaction 
effect  -0.31 (p=.03) 
--- -0.08 0.05 
Consumption 
of vegetable 
Interaction 
effect  
-0.01 -0.19 --- 0.14 
Consumption 
of red meat 
Interaction 
effect  
0.21 
(p=.09) 
0.12 0.09 --- 
Diet 
conscious 
Interaction 
effect  -0.18 (p=.03) 
0.10 -0.03 0.36 
(p=.00) 
Gender Interaction 
effect  
-0.12 0.19 0.01 0.04 
Education Interaction 
effect  
-0.18 0.15 0.38 
(p=.01) 
0.26 
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Results from a two-way ANOVA confirmed that voice condition made a big 
difference in the total response time (see Table 3.5).  Attempting to tease apart the 
variation in response times caused by the experimental manipulation of the voice speed, I 
standardized the response times under each voice condition and analyzed these 
standardized times.  Since response times are usually highly skewed (cf. Ratcliff, 1993), I 
replaced the standardized response times that were above three standard deviations with 
the value three standard deviations above the mean (cf. Ratcliff, 1993; Van Zandt, 2002).   
 A one-way ANOVA on the total response time for this block of questions (with 
the factor being whether respondents were given a definition or not) revealed that 
respondents who were given the definitions turned out to be nonsignificantly faster (mean 
overall standardized response time=-0.030) than those who were not given a definition 
(0.027) (F(1,158)<1, ns).   
Additional analyses of the data showed that one respondent characteristic affected 
the response time – the need for cognition.  According to Petty and Jarvis (1996), people 
with a high need for cognition (HNC) would normally process the questions more 
carefully than those with a low need for cognition (LNC respondents).  Applying the 
conversational maxims requires cognitive effort; the HNC group is more likely to notice 
apparent violations of the conversational maxims and to draw implicatures based on 
apparent violations than their LNC counterparts.  A study by McCabe and Brannon (2004) 
confirmed such a role for the need for cognition.  They reported that HNC respondents 
applied the maxim of quantity to part-whole questions and displayed an attenuated 
correlation between the items, but not LNC respondents.  Their finding suggested that the 
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conversational norm to avoid redundancy is not automatically applied in the survey 
context; only those with a high need for cognition seemed to apply the maxim.   
 Based on this reasoning, I compared average response times for these two groups 
(HNC respondents vs. LNC respondents) with and without definitions.  Figure 3.1 plots 
the mean standardized response times for the two groups. 
 
Figure 3.1. Mean Standardized Response Times for HNC and LNC Respondents 
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
No Definition Given Definition
LNC
HNC
 
The figure partially confirms the hypothesis.  Within the HNC group, those who 
got a definition did take longer (mean standardized response time=-.19) than their 
counterparts who were not given a definition (-.30).  Even though the difference didn’t 
approach significance (F(1,71)<1, ns), the direction was consistent with my hypothesis 
and replicated the finding by McCabe and Brannon (2004).  On the other hand, the LNC 
group was slower on average (mean standardized response time=.19) than the HNC 
group (-.24).6 The difference in response times between the two need for cognition 
groups was significant in the no definition condition (F(1,73)=5.90, p<0.02), but not in 
 
6 The longer response time by the LNC group could be explained by the positive correlation between 
education and need for cognition. The LNC group contains significantly more respondents who had less 
than a college degree. Thus, the LNC respondents are probably slower readers than the HNC respondents. 
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the definition condition (F(1,83)=2.35, p=.13).  A three-way interaction between voice 
speed, definition condition, and need for cognition is marginally significant 
(F(2,148)=2.22, p=.11).  
An item-level analysis of response times showed the same picture as the total 
response times.  In general, the HNC respondents tended to be slower with definitions 
than without definitions, but the reverse was true for LNC respondents. None of the item-
level interactions were significant either.  
 Inferences. I predicted that respondents who got the unnecessary definitions 
would conclude that the definitions were not intended for them or that the terms were not 
being used in their ordinary sense.  I examined responses to the two follow-up questions 
to test for such inferences.  One question specifically asked the respondents whom the 
survey was intended for.  Respondents were somewhat more likely to think that the 
survey was intended for a special population rather than the general public when they got 
the unneeded definitions (7.0% of respondents given definitions vs. 3.6% of those 
without definitions), but the difference was not significant (X2=.72, p=.40).  
 I also asked the respondents whether they believed the four key survey terms 
(poultry, vegetable, fat, and red meat) were used in their ordinary sense or in a special 
technical sense.  All four of these follow-up items used the same scale, in which 1 meant 
the ordinary sense and 5 the technical sense.  The mean responses are displayed in Figure 
3.2.  Higher numbers indicate ratings more in the direction of the technical sense.   
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Figure 3.2. Mean Ratings of Whether Survey Terms Are Used in Technical Sense by 
Definition Condition 
 
It is clear from Figure 3.2 that when given definitions, respondents tended to 
regard the survey terms as used in a more technical way than their counterparts who were 
not shown definitions.  The difference between the two groups of respondents was 
marginally significant for the term “Fat” (F(1,158)=3.04, p=0.08).  Thus, the study offers 
limited support for the notion that respondents found the definitions unnecessary and 
drew inferences to account for them.  
 
3.3 Conclusions 
This study investigated the effects of offering definitions for everyday terms in 
surveys.  I predicted that defining terms that don’t need definitions would violate the 
maxim of manner and create a linguistic anomaly; cooperative respondents recognize the 
anomaly and work out inferences to account for it.  The results presented here lent at best 
weak support for the original hypotheses.  
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First, offering definitions to respondents did seem to influence their responses.  
Providing definitions reduced the variances of the responses, but the effects on 
regressions involving the key items are not easy to interpret and do not show a consistent 
picture.  There is no clear evidence about whether offering redundant definitions 
improves or reduces data quality.  
Second, some respondents did apparently process the definitions.  Respondents 
with a high need for cognition were slower in answering the target questions when they 
were given definitions than when they were not (see Figure 3.1).  Still, these differences 
in response times were not significant.  
Third, respondents who got the definitions were somewhat more likely to infer 
that the survey was targeted at a special population and that the terms were used in a 
technical sense than those who didn’t get the definitions.  Again, though the direction was 
right, the trend was not significant.   
The major limitation of this study lies in its small sample size, which inevitably 
reduces the power of the study.  Even though offering definitions along with survey 
questions could promote more uniform interpretations of the questions, we need to be 
careful with the level of detail and the amount of information to be included in definitions.  
Respondents in this experiment noticed the self-evident definitions and seemed to have 
worked out inferences to account for them; the definitions also affected the variability in 
their responses.  More systematic research should be carried out to investigate the effects 
of offering definitions on survey data quality.  In the meanwhile, a thorough pretesting of 
survey concepts should go beyond detecting simple cognitive problems to investigate 
potential pragmatic issues related to offering definitions.  
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Chapter 4 Three Maxims 
 
This chapter discusses four experiments that examine the maxims of relation, 
quantity, and quality.  The four experiments examine respondents’ use (or misuse) of 
these maxims in responding to web survey questions.  
 
4.1 The Maxim of Relation and Numerical Values of Rating Scales   
4.1.1 Introduction  
Of Grice’s four maxims, the maxim of relation is potentially the most powerful 
one.  It enjoins participants to make their contribution relevant to the aims of the ongoing 
conversation.  This maxim implies that listeners can assume that the speaker’s 
contribution to a conversation is relevant to its goal, unless it is explicitly marked as 
irrelevant.  If information has been included, it should be relevant; otherwise, why would 
the speaker have mentioned it (Hilton, 1995; Schwarz, 1996)?  At the extreme, the 
maxim implies that every feature of an utterance is to be interpreted.   
In survey research settings, Schwarz and Tourangeau and their colleagues have 
demonstrated that respondents make use of various visual features of survey questions in 
interpreting the questions (as shown in Chapter 1).  Respondents consider the visual 
features of the questions to be relevant to survey responses; that is, they see the visual 
features not as style elements as the researchers may intend, but as task elements (cf. 
Couper, Tourangeau, & Kenyon, 2004).  This inference of meaningfulness is based on 
the maxim of relation (cf. Grice, 1989).  For example, the numerical values assigned to a 
rating scale are one feature that seems to be taken as a task element in the survey 
response process.  Several studies by Schwarz and his colleagues demonstrated that the 
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numerical values assigned to the scale points affect the distribution of the responses 
(Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler, Noelle-Neumann, & Clark, 1991; Schwarz & Hippler, 1995; 
Schwarz, Grayson, & Knauper, 1998).  Table 4.1 summarizes the main features of these 
studies.  
 In one experiment, Schwarz and his colleagues asked respondents in a face-to-
face interview to evaluate their success in life along an 11-point rating scale, with one 
endpoint labeled “not at all successful” and the other “extremely successful” (Schwarz, 
Knauper, Hippler, Noelle-Neumann, & Clark 1991, Experiment 1).  The scale was 
presented on a show card in the form of a ladder and ranged either from 0= “not at all 
successful” to 10= “extremely successful,” or from -5= ‘not at all successful” to 5= 
“extremely successful.”  Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the two 
numerical value conditions.  Schwarz and colleagues found a mean shift in rating towards 
the higher end of the scale when the scale ran from -5 to 5 as compared to 0 to 10.  
Respondents were particularly unlikely to endorse a value between -5 and 0.  A second 
experiment replicated the effect of numerical values with a self-administered 
questionnaire and demonstrated the effect both for self-reports and reports about one’s 
parents. 
 The third experiment provided more direct evidence of the effects of numerical 
values on the interpretation of the scale end labels.  Respondents were asked in an open-
end question to provide their interpretation of someone else’ reports given along two 
different scales.  The findings indicated that respondents drew more extreme inferences 
from reports given on a -5 to 5 scale than from formally identical reports given on a 0 to 
10 scale (Schwarz, Knauper, et al., 1991, Experiment 3).  
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In a fourth experiment, Schwarz and Hippler (1995) compared the effects of 
numerical values in two modes of administration – telephone interviews and mail 
questionnaires.  Respondents were asked to evaluate politicians along an 11-point scale, 
running from 0 to 10 or from -5 to 5, in both modes of administration.  In both modes, 
they found the usual mean shift to the higher end of the scale with the -5 to 5 scale 
(Schwarz & Hippler, 1995). 
 O’Muircheartaigh and his colleagues replicated the work of Schwarz, Knauper, et 
al. (1991).  They demonstrated that numerical values induced a mean shift in responses 
whether or not the numerical values assigned to the rating scales were explicitly 
mentioned in the question stem and whether the scale labels were bipolar or unipolar 
(O’Muircheartaigh, Gaskell, & Wright, 1995).  
 The prior studies all used rating scales.  Schwarz and his colleagues also 
investigated the effects of different numerical values attached to a frequency scale 
(Schwarz, Grayson, & Knauper, 1998, Experiment 1).  The frequency scale ranged either 
from 0 to 10 or from 1 to 11.  The end labels remained “rarely” for 0 or 1 and “often” for 
10 or 11.  Again, the numerical values of the scales influenced the responses – 
respondents reported higher frequencies when the scale ranged from 0 to 10 than when it 
ranged from 1 to 11.  Schwarz and colleagues speculated that the end label “rarely” 
indicated a lower frequency when combined with value 0 than with value 1; as a result, 
the scale running from 0 to 10 shifted the means to the higher end of the frequency 
(Schwarz et al., 1998).   
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Table 4.1. Experimental Conditions of Studies on Numerical Values of Rating Scales
Study Mode of
Administration
Polarity of End Label Domain of
Content
Special
feature
Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler,
Noelle-Neumann, and Clark
(1991, Experiment 1)
Face-to-Face/Show
Card
Unipolar (“not at all successful”-
“extremely successful”)
Success in life --
Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler,
Noelle-Neumann, and Clark
(1991, Experiment 2)
Self-Administered
Questionnaire
Bipolar (“unsuccessful”-“successful”)
vs.
Unipolar (“not so successful”-“very
successful”)
-Success in life
-Happiness of
childhood
Self-
reporting vs.
Proxy
reporting
Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler,
Noelle-Neumann, and Clark
(1991, Experiment 3)
Self-Administered
Questionnaire
Bipolar (“dissatisfied”-“very satisfied”)
Unipolar (“not so successful”-
“successful”)
-Health
satisfaction
-Success on
academic
exams
Evaluation
of third party
Schwarz and Hippler (1995) Telephone
Interview
vs.
Mail
Questionnaires
Bipolar (“don’t think very highly of
this politician” – “think very highly of
this politician”
Evaluation of
politicians
--
O’Muircheartaigh, Gaskell,
and Wright (1995,
Experiment 1)
Face-to-face/Show
Card
Bipolar (“much more entertaining than
the programmes” – “much less
entertaining than the programmes”)
Evaluation of
advertisements
Explicit
mentioning
scale in
question
stem vs. not
O’Muircheartaigh, Gaskell,
and Wright (1995,
Experiment 2)
Face-to-face/Show
Card
Bipolar (“given much less power” –
“given much more power”)
vs.
Unipolar (“not given any more power”
– “given much more power”)
Evaluation of
the Advertising
Standards
Authority
--
Schwarz et al. (1998,
Experiment 1)
SAQ Unipolar (“rarely” – “often”) Frequency of
behaviors
Scales of 0
to 10 vs. 1
to11
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Across the various studies in Table 4.1, the numerical values assigned to scale 
points consistently affected survey responses.  The effect is found across modes of 
administration (telephone interview vs. mail surveys vs. face-to-face interviews), for both 
unipolar and bipolar scales, for various domains, and for self and proxy reports.  One 
limitation of the studies is that only one (out of the eight reported) sought direct evidence 
that the response changes induced by the numerical values were due to respondents’ 
utilization of the maxim of relation during the survey response process. 
 My first experiment in this web study aimed to fill this gap, seeking further direct 
evidence that respondents use the maxim of relation when answering rating scales 
questions with numerical labels.  Unlike the previous studies, this one attempted to create 
conditions in which the maxim of relation wouldn’t apply.  The numerical values 
assigned to scale points were displayed in a distinct font that was much fainter than the 
font used for the question text and the verbal label.  Such fonts are typically used in paper 
questionnaires for information that is not intended for the respondents.  I thought that 
presenting the numerical values in a faint font might lead respondents to discount their 
relevance.  
 I hypothesized that the mean shift associated with negative scale values would be 
reduced when the numbers were in the faint font, and the inferences about the meaning of 
the end labels associated with different numerical values would converge in the faint font 
condition.  
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4.1.2 Method 
Overview. This experiment, together with three other experiments, was 
embedded in a web survey conducted by MS Interactive.  Survey Sampling Inc. (SSI) 
selected the sample for this study from its opt-in Web panel (Survey Spot) of over one 
million persons who have signed up online to receive survey invitations.  SSI selected 
17,362 e-mail addresses for this study and sent out e-mail messages inviting the 
recipients to take part in “a study of attitudes and lifestyles.”  The e-mail invitations 
included the web address (URL) for the survey web site and a unique identification 
number (which prevented respondents from completing the survey more than once).  The 
survey ran from May 24 to June 2, 2005.  Of the 17,362 invited to participate in the 
survey, 1,071 completed the entire survey (and 146 others got part way through) for a 
response rate (AAPOR [2000] RR1) of 6%.  The questionnaire included questions on a 
range of topics, most of them attitudinal.  The 18-item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, 
Petty, and Kao, 1984) was included in the last section, together with demographic 
questions.  This experiment came first in the questionnaire.   
Experimental manipulation. This experiment manipulated both the numerical 
values assigned to the scale points (replicating the earlier studies) and the appearance of 
the scale values in a 2 (numerical values: 0 to 6 vs. -3 to 3) x 2 (appearance: normal font 
vs. faint font) factorial design.  The faint font version of the scales shaded the numerical 
values for each scale point so that the numbers were legible, but not as obvious and 
distinct as other texts in the same screen (see Figure 4.1).  Table 4.2 displays the number 
of completes per experimental condition. 
 
68
Table 4.2. Experiment 4: Number of Completes Per Experimental Condition 
 0 to 6 -3 to 3 Total 
Normal Font 259 271 530 
Faint Font 271 270 541 
Total 530 542 1071 
Target questions. Respondents were asked to rate their success in life, their 
moodiness, their nervousness, and optimism along one of the four randomly assigned 
scales.  Respondents got the same numerical labels for all of the target items. 
Follow-up questions. The follow-up questions asked respondents about their use 
of the scale values and the inferences they drew about the scale end labels.  The exact 
wordings of the target questions and follow-up questions are given in Table 4.3.  
Figure 4.1. Example of a Faded Scale 
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Table 4.3. Questions Used in Experiment 4 on Maxim of Relation 
Target Questions:  
How successful have you been in life, so far? 
Overall, how moody would you say you are? 
In general, how nervous do you think you are? 
How optimistic would you say you are? 
Follow-up Questions:  
To your best recollection, what numerical value do you remember was assigned to the      
leftmost scale point (the starting value) in the scale you have used for the last four     
 questions? 
How much attention did you pay to the numerical values of the scales when you  
 answered the questions? 
How useful did you find the numerical values in helping you answer the questions? 
Now let us focus on one particular question you answered just now. That is, ‘Overall,           
how successful would you say that you have been in your life?’  What do you think    
 the scale label ‘Not at all successful’ means to most people like you? (OPEN-END) 
Which one of these options comes closest to the meaning of “Not at all successful?” 
1 Modest Accomplishment 
2 Little accomplishment 
3 Absence of Significant Accomplishment 
4 Little failure 
5 Modest failure 
6 Utter failure 
4.1.3 Results  
I begin by presenting the analyses of responses to the four target questions, 
followed by analyses on respondents’ use of and inferences about the scale.  
Responses. For all four scale conditions, I coded the responses from 1 to 7, where 
1 corresponded either to 0 or -3, and 7 to 6 or 3.  To compare responses to scales with 
different numerical values, I examined the mean ratings of the 0 to 6 scales and of the -3 
to 3 condition (see Table 4.4).  Two-way ANOVAs were conducted on all four target 
questions, showing that numerical values had a significant effect on responses for three 
out of the four items (see Table 4.5. for ANOVA results). 
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Table 4.4. Experiment 4: Mean Ratings By Experimental Condition 
 Normal Font Faint Font 
0 to 6 -3 to 3 0 to 6 -3 to 3
Successful 4.92 5.16 4.79 5.09 
Moody 3.53 3.75 3.55 3.83 
Nervous 3.17 3.47 3.32 3.40 
Optimistic 5.02 5.24 5.11 5.06 
Average of last 2 items 4.10 4.35 4.22 4.23 
Table 4.5. Experiment 4: Two-way ANOVA Results  
 
Scale Values 
 
Scale Font 
Interaction  
(Values x Font) 
Success  F(1,1059)=12.89 p<.001 F(1,1059)=1.8 ns F(1,1059)=.13 ns 
Mood F(1,1062)=7.13 p<.01 F(1,1062)=.26 ns F(1,1062)=.12 ns 
Nervousness F(1,1059)=3.95 p=.05 F(1,1059)=.19 ns F(1,1059)=1.45 ns 
Optimism F(1,1063)=1.02 ns F(1,1063)=.27 ns F(1,1063)=2.83 p<.10
Average of 
last 2 items 
 
F(1,1055)=5.76 
 
p=.02 
 
F(1,1055)=0 
 
ns F(1,1055)=4.77 p=.03
There was some evidence that the effect of the numerical labels was dampened 
when the faint font was used.  I calculated the difference between the average rating for 
the two scales for each item and font condition.  Positive numbers indicated that the 
negative scale values induced a mean shift in ratings to the higher end of the scale.  
Figure 4.2 presents the results. 
Figure 4.2. Mean Shifts Due to Negative Numbers by Their Font Across 4 Items 
 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Normal Font Faint Font
Success
Mood
Nervousness
Optimism
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As evident from the figure, the negative scale values produced a mean shift in 
ratings in almost all situations – this is apparent from the positive values in all conditions 
except for the optimism item in the faint font condition.  Furthermore, the mean shifts 
caused by the negative scale values were clearly reduced for two of the items 
(nervousness and optimism) when the numerical labels were in the lighter font.  Taking 
an average of the last two items as the dependent variable, I ran another two-way 
ANOVA, which revealed a significant interaction effect between the numerical values 
and the font (see last row in Table 4.5).  Further analysis showed that, for this average, 
the simple main effect of the numerical values was significant only when the numbers 
were in the normal font (F(1,1055)=10.40, p=.001), but not when they were in the lighter 
font (F(1,1055)=.02, p=.88).  A planned contrast was also significant, showing that the 
faint font dampened the effects of negative scale values.  The faint font seemed to prevent 
respondents from perceiving the numerical values as relevant for these two items. 
Inferences. I assessed the inferences respondents drew based on their answers to 
follow-up questions.  According to Grice, conversational implicatures are worked out 
when maxims are flouted but the CP is still presumably being observed (Grice, 1989).  
The extra effort needed to work out an implicature should produce better recall of the 
numbers that triggered the interpretative maxim.  In addition, respondents should have 
paid more attention to the numbers and considered the numerical values more useful 
when they used them in interpreting the response scale.  
I examined the percentage of respondents who recalled the leftmost scale value 
correctly by the scale values and the font of the numbers.  Figure 4.3 indicates that more 
respondents recalled the number correctly when presented with the -3 to 3 scale labels 
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than with the 0 to 6 labels.  A two-way logit analysis revealed a marginally significant 
main effect of numerical values on the percentage of respondents who accurately recalled 
the numbers (X2=3.18, p=0.07).  Neither the main effect of the font (X2= 1.27, p= 0.26)
nor the interaction between the numbers and fonts (X2= 0.57, p=0.45) were significant.  
Still, the pattern is consistent with the prediction – the negative values were recalled 
better overall and the difference in recall is less marked when the font was lighter.    
Figure 4.3. Percent Correctly Recalling Numerical End Point by Scale 
Condition 
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54%
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58%
60%
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Figure 4.4. Mean Ratings of ‘Attention’ and ‘Usefulness’ by Scale Condition 
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Another two follow-up items asked respondents how much attention they paid to 
the numerical values attached to the scale and how useful they considered those numbers.  
Figure 4.4 plots the mean ratings of attention and usefulness across the four scale 
conditions.  Higher numbers indicate more attention and higher usefulness ratings 
Figure 4.4 shows that the numerical labels seemed to play an important role in the 
attention ratings; respondents tended to pay more attention when the scale started with a 
negative number (-3) than with zero (F(1,1066)=15.65, p<.0001), which confirmed my 
prediction.  There is also a marginally significant interaction effect of the numerical 
values with the font (F(1,1066)= 2.94, p<.09), indicating that the faint font reduced the 
effect of the numbers – respondents paid less attention on average to the negative end 
labels when it was in the lighter font.    
As for the usefulness rating, neither the numerical values (F(1,1059)=2.19, p<
0.14) nor the font (F(1,1059)=.02, p<.89) had significant main effects.  The interaction 
effect is marginally significant at p<.07 (F(1,1059)=3.30).  With the fainter fonts, 
respondents rated the numerical labels equally useful.  
To determine what respondents inferred from the numerical values, the last 
follow-up question asked respondents what the scale label “not at all successful” meant to 
them.7 There were six answer categories to this question (see bottom panel of Table 4.3 
for the exact wordings of the six answer categories).  I collapsed the answer categories 
into two groups – one group represents the absence of success and the other group the 
presence of failure.  Figure 4.5 plots the percentage of people inferring “presence of 
failure” by scale condition.  
 
7 I present here only the results based on the closed-end question presented above.  Analyses of the open-
ended responses were similar and didn’t change the conclusions reported here.  
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The result supports the conjecture of Schwarz and his colleagues (1991) about 
how respondents interpret the scales with different numerical labels.  Significantly more 
respondents interpreted the scale label “not at all successful” to mean the presence of 
failure when the numerical labels ran from -3 to 3 than when they ran from 0 to 10.  The 
logit analysis revealed a significant main effect of scale numerical values (X2=5.13, 
p=.02), but no effect of scale appearance and no interaction between the two variables.  
Respondents did take the numerical values into consideration when they constructed their 
answers.  Once again, the effect of the label seems reduced when the numbers were 
presented in the lighter font (see Figure 4.5 below) but the relevant interaction is not 
significant.   
Figure 4.5. Percentage of Respondents Inferring “Presence of Failure” by Scale 
Condition  
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58%
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64%
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68%
70%
72%
Normal, 0 to 6 Normal, -3 to 3 Faint, 0 to 6 Faint, -3 to 3  
Response times. I also examined the time respondents took to complete the four 
target questions.  On average, respondents took longer to complete the block when given 
a scale running from -3 to 3 (mean response time=54.1 seconds) than when presented a 
scale running from 0 to 6 (mean response time=49.8). The difference is marginally 
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significant (F(1,1067)=3.49, p=.06), suggesting again that respondents did notice the 
negative values and took them into account in forming their responses.  The font main 
effect and the interaction between the numerical values and the font were not significant.  
 
4.1.4 Conclusions 
This experiment replicated the findings of Schwarz, Knauper, and colleagues 
(1991) and demonstrated that the numerical values of the scales affected survey responses.  
Scale appearance (i.e., the font of the numerical values) moderated the effects of the 
numerical values, especially for the last two of the four questions.  Further research is 
needed to investigate under what circumstances factors such as scale appearance are able 
to reduce or eliminate the perceived relevance of the numerical values to the meaning of 
the scale.  
Follow-up questions supported the view that respondents applied the maxim of 
relation when they encountered a scale with negative values and that they generated 
different inferences based on the scale numbers (Schwarz, Knauper, et al., 1991).  When 
respondents were presented a scale with negative numerical labels, they took more time 
to respond, were significantly more likely to say they paid attention to the numerical 
values, and were (nonsignificantly) more likely to say they considered the numbers useful.  
They were also able to correctly recall the numerical value assigned to the leftmost scale 
point more often, and more likely to infer that the scale label “not at all successful” 
associated with -3 meant “presence of failure.”  Thus, this experiment presented a variety 
of evidence that the CP and, in particular, the maxim of relation were being applied.  
Unfortunately, it seems that the effect of the numerical labels was quite robust.  Even 
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when the numbers were presented in a distinctive lighter font, they still had an effect on 
respondents’ answers and their inferences about the meaning of the response scale.  
 
4.2 The Maxim of Quantity and Similar Items 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 The maxim of quantity concerns the informativeness of an utterance in a context.  
It requires speakers to make their contribution as informative as is required, but no more 
informative.  In survey research settings, this maxim invites respondents to provide all 
the information the survey researcher seems interested in, but not other information that 
may come to mind.  On the other hand, it also discourages providing information that has 
already been given earlier or information that “goes without saying” because, as a rule, 
speakers should not burden hearers with information they are already likely to know 
(Hilton, 1995; Schwarz, 1996, 2000; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001).  Thus, for utterances 
to conform to the maxim of quantity, speakers (both researchers and respondents) must 
be able to provide all that their addressees want to know without being redundant.  
A few studies have demonstrated situations where survey respondents appeared to 
apply the maxim of quantity in answering seemingly repetitive questions.  One set of 
studies asked respondents a specific question (e.g., happiness with marriage or romantic 
life) and then a more general question (e.g., happiness with life as a whole).  The 
correlation between the two questions was found to be lower when the questions were 
administered in the specific-general order than the general-specific (cf. Kalton, Collins, & 
Brook, 1978; Mason, Carlson, & Tourangeau, 1994; McCabe & Brannon, 2004; Schwarz, 
Strack, & Mai, 1991; Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988; Tourangeau, Rasinski, & 
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Bradburn, 1991).  The most common explanation is that survey respondents applied the 
maxim of quantity in answering the items.  Respondents interpreted the general question 
as excluding the domain mentioned in the specific question and took the general item to 
mean something like “aside from your marriage” (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991; 
Tourangeau, Rasinski, & Bradburn, 1991).  Factors that prevented respondents from 
applying the maxim in this way included increasing the number of specific questions, 
rephrasing the general question to include the specific items, and placing the general and 
specific question in different conversational contexts (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991; 
Tourangeau, Rasinski, & Bradburn, 1991). 
Another example of apparently redundant questions occurs in a study by Strack 
and his colleagues (Strack, Schwarz, & Wanke, 1991).  They asked respondents to report 
both their happiness and their satisfaction with life as a whole.  They varied the 
introduction to the two questions and the appearance of the questions, so that, in one 
condition, the two questions were placed in the same conversational context, whereas in 
the other, the two questions belonged to two different contexts (because they were in 
different questionnaires).  Strack and colleagues observed a lower correlation between the 
two items when they were in the same conversational context than when they were in 
different contexts (Strack et al., 1991).  They attributed the difference to respondents’ 
application of the maxim of quantity when the two items were in the same conversational 
context.  Two highly similar questions in the same conversational context appear 
repetitive in that answers to them would have been quite alike; to uphold the Cooperative 
Principle, respondents inferred that there must be differences – minute or not – between 
78
the two apparently similar items and responded with that fine distinction in mind (Strack 
et al., 1991).   
I carried out two experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) to clarify when respondents 
apply the maxim of quantity and when they do not.  The experiments varied the 
introductions, the wording, and the total number of related items to determine which 
factors govern inferences about redundancy.  
An introduction usually signals the start of a new block of questions and the 
beginning of a new conversational context.  If the introduction gives respondents 
permission to report redundant information by explaining why two similar questions 
appear in the same conversational context, then a higher correlation between the two 
items should be observed – the introduction makes it clear that the maxim of quantity is 
no longer applicable.  
The perceived redundancy of two highly similar items comes mainly from 
semantic overlap between the concepts, but the appearance of redundancy may be 
heightened by syntactical similarity.  If Gricean implicatures are triggered by conceptual 
overlap alone, then a superficial change, such as reversed wording, shouldn’t change the 
correlation between the two items.  However, if syntactic similarity between the items 
also contributes, then the magnitude of correlation should be different when an item is 
reverse worded.  
Two similar items are found to trigger the maxim of quantity (Strack et al., 1991).  
However, increasing the number of similar items to four might actually boost the 
correlation between the same two items because it is hard to apply the maxim of quantity 
when there are multiple items and to make distinctions among them.  
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4.2.2 Method  
Experiments 4 and 5 were embedded in the same web survey as Experiment 3.  
Experiment 4 was the second experiment overall starting from question 9 in the web 
questionnaire; Experiment 5 was the fourth one in the questionnaire, beginning at 
question 20.  Both experiments employ a 2 x 2 factorial design, with independent 
randomizations.  
Experiment 4 design. Experiment 4 varied the introduction and question wording 
independently.  The introduction used in the study by Strack and colleagues (1991) was 
used to create a conversational context for the two questions that followed: “Now we 
have two questions about your life.” I refer to this as the “general” version of the 
introduction. 
The second version (the “specific” version) highlighted the overlap in meaning 
across the two questions: “The next two questions are to measure your outlook on life.” 
By highlighting their shared purpose, the specific introduction would, I thought, give 
respondents permission to provide redundant information.  
To test for the effect of syntactic similarity, I varied the wording of one of the pair 
target questions.  One half of the respondents got the normal wording: 
“How happy would you say you are with your life as a whole?”  
“How satisfied would you say you are with your life?”  
 
The other half got the reversed wording: 
“How unhappy would you say you are with your life as a whole?”  
“How satisfied would you say you are with your life?” 
 
The number of completed interviews by experimental condition for experiment 4 (and 
experiment 5) is shown in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6.  Experiments 4 and 5: Number of Completes per Experimental Condition 
 General Introduction Specific Introduction Total
Experiment 4    
Normal Wording 276 266 542 
 Reversed Wording 257 272 529 
 Total 533 538 1071
Experiment 5    
2 Items 268 260 528 
 4 Items 252 291 543 
 Total 520 551 1071
Design of experiment 5. Experiment 5 again varied the introduction to the target 
items in the same way as Experiment 4.  The second factor varied the number of target 
items included in the block.  Half of the respondents got two similar items.  The other 
half got the same two items plus two new items about the same topic.  All four questions 
were taken from a scale assessing anxiety.  The items are displayed in Table 4.7.  The 
number of completes in each experimental cell is given in the bottom panel of Table 4.6.  
Table 4.7. Items for Experiment 5 
Two-item Four-item 
How easily do you get disturbed? How easily do you get upset? 
How easily do you get stressed out?
How easily do you get upset? How easily do you get irritated?
How easily do you get irritated? 
Target questions. The main target questions for Experiment 4 are the two 
questions asking respondents to rate their happiness and satisfaction with life.  The target 
questions for Experiment 5 are the two common items, asking respondents about how 
easily they get upset and irritated.  
Follow-up questions. The same set of follow-up questions was used in both 
experiments: 
 “Think about the last two questions you have just answered. How repetitive 
did you think these two questions were?” 
 “To what extent did meanings of these two questions differ?” 
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 “Based on your understanding of the two questions, did you think they were 
supposed to measure the same thing or different things?” 
 “Now thinking about how you came up with answers for the last two 
questions, did you think about the same things or different things when you 
answered these two questions?” 
 
4.2.3 Results 
The analyses begin with an examination of the responses to the target items, with 
a focus on the correlations between the two target items in both experiments.8 The 
second part of the analysis examines the inferences respondents drew.  
Correlations. Table 4.8 displays the correlation coefficients by experimental 
conditions for Experiment 4.  The reverse-worded items were recoded so that they are in 
the same direction as the normal wording items with higher numbers indicating higher 
happiness.  It is clear from the table that the introductions did not have a significant effect 
on the correlation coefficients (F(1,V)=.85, p=.36), regardless of the wording condition.  
This was contrary to the original hypothesis that the specific introduction would 
discourage respondents from applying the maxim of quantity since it highlighted the 
purpose of the redundancy.  The size of correlations Experiment 4 produced across 
introductions fall between those observed in the same conversational context (r=.75) in 
the study by Strack et al. (1991) and those obtained in the different conversational 
context (r=.96).  Thus, it looked like both versions of the introduction seemed to trigger 
the maxim of quantity, but the effect was not as strong as that observed by Strack and 
colleagues.  The specific introduction, whose wording was probably too similar to that of 
the general introduction, was not successful at halting the maxim of quantity.  
 
8 I also checked whether the means of the answers varied as a function of the experimental factors. Reverse 
wording significantly affected the mean responses to the two target items for Experiment 4 whereas the 
introduction variable interacted with the number of items on the mean responses for Experiment 5.  
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Reversing the wording of the happiness item had a large impact on the correlation; 
it lowered the correlation between the pair target items significantly.  In other words, 
respondents seemed to have differentiated between the target pair more when one of the 
items was reversely worded9.
Table 4.8. Experiment 4: Correlation Coefficients by Experimental Condition 
Experiment 4 (Happiness and Satisfaction)
General introduction – Normal Wording 0.87
Specific introduction – Normal Wording  0.85
General introduction – Reversed Wording 0.51
Specific introduction – Reversed Wording  0.47
The results from Experiment 5 displayed a different picture from those of 
Experiment 4 (see Table 4.9).  First, the number of items had a significant effect on the 
correlations obtained.  Consistent with my hypothesis, the correlation between the two 
key items was significantly higher when they were asked with two other items about the 
same topic than when they were asked by themselves (F(1,V)=9.83, p<.01).  Respondents 
appeared to have stopped trying to differentiate among the items where there were four 
items bundled together.  It is likely that at this point the maxim of relation was at work 
rather than the maxim of quantity.  This is consistent to the part-whole literature; when 
the number of specific questions was increased to three, respondents took the general 
question as asking for an average or sum over the three specific questions rather than as 
excluding the specific question when there was only one specific question preceding the 
general one (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991).  In addition, the introduction had a 
 
9 An alternative explanation for the low correlation is that “unhappy” and “happy” are not direct opposites; 
thus, asking about unhappiness is not exactly the opposite to asking about happiness. This explanation is 
plausible.  However, responses to a later follow-up question seemed to rule out this alternative. More 
respondents considered the target pair as measuring the same thing when “unhappy” was used in place of 
“happy.” And this inference seemed to have fit in the “avoid redundancy” hypothesis (see Inference section 
for more detailed discussion).  
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marginally significant interaction with the number of items (F(1, V)=3.16, p<.10).  The 
specific introduction reduced the correlation when there were only two items (though this 
was not significant), but significantly increased the correlations between the two key 
items when two other related questions preceded them (Z=-2.07, p=.04). 
 
Table 4.9. Experiment 5: Correlation Coefficients by Experimental Conditions 
Experiment 5 (Getting upset and Getting irritated)
General introduction – 2 items   0.70
General introduction – 4 items  0.74
Specific introduction – 2 items 0.67
Specific introduction – 4 items 0.81
Inferences. The first two follow-up questions were intended to assess the 
perceived redundancy of the target questions.  They asked respondents to rate how 
repetitive and how different the target items seemed on a seven-point scale.  In both 
experiments, the responses to these two follow-up questions were highly correlated – the 
coefficients in the high .50s.  Thus, I combined responses to the two questions into a 
redundancy index, with higher numbers indicating higher perceived redundancy.  
For the two target questions in Experiment 4, neither the introduction nor the 
wording affected respondents’ perceptions of how redundant the two target questions 
were.  The two experimental variables didn’t significantly interact either.  In Experiment 
5, though, the introduction had a marginally significant effect on respondents’ perception 
of redundancy.  Respondents tended to rate the two target items to be more redundant 
when they had been given the general introduction (mean rating=3.60) than the specific 
introduction (3.43) (F(1,1059)=3.07, p<.10).  Increasing the number of items also 
increased the average redundancy rating.  The mean redundancy rating was 3.42 when 
the two target questions were asked by themselves, but it went up to 3.60 when the two 
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target questions followed two similar items also assessing anxiety.  The difference was 
only marginally significant, however (F(1,1059)=3.43, p<.10). 
 The last two follow-up questions asked respondents whether they thought the 
target items were intended to measure the same thing or not, and whether they used the 
same experiences to answer the two similar questions or not.  For experiment 4, logit 
analysis showed more respondents (48%) thought the target questions were supposed to 
measure the same thing when one target item was reverse worded than when the two 
items were worded in the same direction (36%).  The difference was significant (X2=5.09, 
p<.03).  In other words, reverse wording didn’t break the conceptual overlap.  This 
inference explained the lower correlations I obtained in Experiment 4; the inference that 
the two items were supposed to measure the same thing might have led respondents to 
further distinguish between the items when they form answers to the questions; thus, 
bringing down the correlations.   
 For experiment 5, there was no significant effect of either experimental variable 
on whether respondents thought the target items were intended to measure the same thing 
or not.  In addition, whether respondents reported using the same experience or different 
experiences in forming their answers to the target items was not affected by any of the 
experimental factors or their interactions.  
 
4.2.4 Conclusions 
These two experiments attempted to replicate and extend the work by Strack and 
colleagues (1991) on how respondents deal with apparently redundant questions.  The 
Gricean tendency to ‘avoid redundancy’ seemed to be robust across introductions in 
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Experiment 4.  Respondents seemed to have differentiated between the two similar items 
whichever introduction they were given, but the effect was not so strong as those 
observed in Strack et al. (1991).  The introduction variable, however, did interact with the 
number of items in affecting correlations in the second experiment (Experiment 5, Table 
4.9), though the effect was only marginally significant.   
The effects of reverse wording on responses and inferences were surprising.  
When I reversed the wording of one of the two target items, it significantly reduced the 
correlation between them, because more respondents believed the two items were 
supposed to measure the same thing.  Reverse wording had no impact on ratings of the 
redundancy of the two items.  
 Adding two more items boosted the correlations between the two target items and 
it also caused people to regard them as significantly more redundant.  
 These two experiments demonstrated that respondents do not necessarily apply 
the maxim of quantity when answering similar questions.  Some factors (e.g., the number 
of similar items to be asked at the same time) seem to suppress the maxim of quantity; 
others (e.g., reversing the wording of one of the items) seem to strengthen the need for 
the maxim of quantity.  Sometimes, factors interact with each other (e.g, introduction and 
the number of items).  
 
4.3 The Maxim of Quality and Presuppositions 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The maxim of quality concerns the likely truth value of an utterance.  A 
cooperative communicator is expected to speak the truth rather than telling lies (Grice, 
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1989).  As a result, a hearer usually considers the probable truth value of an utterance to 
be high unless he or she has legitimate reasons to doubt the speaker’s sincerity, reliability, 
or knowledge.  This maxim applies not only to what is said, but also to what is 
presupposed by the utterance.   
A presupposition can be regarded as simply any condition that the speaker and the 
hearer normally assume to hold for an utterance to be contextually appropriate (Stalnaker, 
2002).  Linguists have taken a number of different views on presuppositions.  One 
perspective is the conversational view proposed by Stalnaker (Stalnaker, 1974, 2002; see 
also Simons, 2001, 2003).  According to Stalnaker, presupposition is primarily a property 
of speakers and listeners, not a formal property of sentences.  A speaker’s 
presuppositions are, roughly, those propositions which he/she believes to constitute the 
accepted background information for the conversation in which he/she is engaged.  
Stalnaker thus links presupposition to the common ground the speaker and listener share 
(Stalnaker, 2002).  Presupposition is treated as a restriction on the common ground – the 
set of propositions constituting the current context.  The failure or non-satisfaction of the 
presupposition makes a given utterance inappropriate in a given context. 
Since speakers and listeners have their own set of beliefs about which 
presuppositions are in the common ground, ideally the presuppositions of the speaker 
should match those of the listener, producing a nondefective context (Stalnaker, 2002).  
However, when the hearers detect a discrepancy between their presupposition and those 
of the speakers, they may do one of several things.  If the listeners consider the speaker 
unreliable, they are most likely to respond with an explicit rejection of the presupposition.  
But if the listeners consider the speaker reliable on this point, they might add the 
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presupposition to the set of propositions in the common ground.  Or if the listeners 
consider the speaker unreliable with respect to the proposition but don’t have any interest 
in challenging its truth, they might merely decide to go along with the speaker’s 
presupposition. 
In a survey research setting, survey respondents cannot usually express their 
rejection of the presupposition conveyed by questions unless the researcher provides a 
response option (e.g., “Does not apply”).  But if respondents choose to accept the 
researcher’s presupposition and add it to the common ground, their subsequent responses 
can be affected.   
There is evidence showing that presuppositions carried by questions can modify 
respondents’ memory about past events.  For example, Lipscomb, McAllister, and 
Bregman (1985) looked at the effect of using unmarked modifiers (versus marked 
modifiers) on respondents’ numerical estimates in eyewitness reports.  The unmarked 
modifier of a dimension has a nominal or neutral use that refers to the whole dimension 
whereas the marked modifier designates the absence of such a property and has a lower 
bound of zero (Harris, 1973).  Thus, as the unmarked modifiers such as “how long” or 
“how heavy” presuppose no upper limit with regard to the actual length/weight, 
respondents tended to provide higher numerical estimates as compared to the use of 
marked modifiers such as “how short” and “how light” (Lipscomb, McAllister, & 
Bregman, 1985; see also Harris, 1973).  
In several experiments, Loftus demonstrated that presuppositions affected 
answers to subsequent questions, even to questions asked some time afterwards (Loftus 
& Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1975).  For example, Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed that the 
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question, “About how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?” 
consistently elicited a higher estimate of speed than when “smashed” was replaced by 
“collided,” “bumped,” “contacted,” or “hit.”  The differences in the estimates of speed 
reflected the process of including the extra information presupposed by the different 
verbs into the common ground (see also Loftus, 1975).  
Survey researchers have documented the influence of presuppositions on survey 
responses for at least two decades.  Schuman and Presser (1981), for instance, observed a 
large percentage of respondents offered opinions on obscure issues; the act of asking a 
question presupposes that the issue exists and is important.  This presupposition 
apparently put pressure on respondents to give opinions about nonexistent topics or ones 
they were unfamiliar with (see also Bishop, Tuchfarber, & Oldendick, 1986, Bishop, 
Oldendick, & Tuchfarber, 1983).  More respondents opted for a “Don’t Know” or “No 
Opinion” option when they were presented first with a filter question that asked whether 
they know anything about the topic; the filter carried the implication that not knowing 
was a possible response.  
In a similar way, direct questions such as “How many times did you do X?” or 
“How concerned are you with Y?” presuppose that one did X or that one should be 
concerned about Y, which may or may not be appropriate.  Nonetheless, assuming that 
the survey designers are cooperative and reliable communicators, the respondents may 
take the presuppositions to be true and base their responses on this premise or reinterpret 
the questions to fit the presuppositions.  For instance, Knauper (1998) showed that 
questions asking respondents “In the past 10 years, how many times did you witness a 
crime?” elicited significantly more reports of witnessing crimes, and fewer reports of no 
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instances.  Knauper (1998) argued that, because the question “how many times did you 
witness a crime?” presupposes that one has witnessed (at least) a crime, respondents 
inferred the category “crime” included less serious incidents.  A filtered version of the 
question that asked first whether respondents had witnessed a crime, on the other hand, 
did not carry this presupposition.  Respondents reported fewer (and more serious) crimes.  
Sterngold, Warland, and Herrmann reported similar findings (1994).  They showed that 
the direct degree-of-concern questions (“How concerned are you with___?”) might be 
leading questions, encouraging respondents to overstate their concerns.  By contrast, the 
use of filter questions (“Are you concerned with___ or not?”) produced a higher 
percentage of “not concerned” responses and fewer responses at the upper end of the 
response scale (Sterngold, Warland, & Herrmann, 1994).  Thus, filter questions seem to 
eliminate the presupposition that one should be concerned.  
My final experiment (Experiment 6) examined the impact of presuppositions on 
people’s opinion about general political issues.  Since the issues used in this experiment 
(such as environment and agriculture) are vaguely defined and broad in scope, 
respondents were left to decide which specific aspects of the issues they were being asked 
to evaluate.  This experiment examined two possible methods to foster a presupposition 
of importance.  Since asking a question itself presupposes that an issue exists and is 
important, respondents will consider an issue more important when a previous question 
asks about it than when this issue is not mentioned in the earlier item.  Furthermore, 
respondents will give a higher importance rating to an issue when they are asked a direct 
question about it, such as “How important is __?” than when they were first asked a filter 
question.  The hypothesis is that respondents will adopt the presupposition of importance 
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when a direct question is asked or when the same issue is mentioned in an earlier 
question and will express higher concern about the issue.  
 
4.3.2 Method 
 This experiment was included in the same web survey as Experiments 3, 4, and 5.   
Experimental variables. The first factor was whether or not the issue appeared in 
a previous block of questions.  Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two blocks 
of prior questions, asking them to evaluate the level of government spending on various 
programs.  Table 4.10 gives the exact wording of the two blocks of questions.  
Respondents were then asked to judge the importance of four target issues – two of which 
came from each block – and to rate their concern about each of these issues.  
Table 4.10. Experiment 6: Questions in the Spending Block 
There are many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or 
inexpensively. For each of the following problems, please tell me whether you think 
we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.  
Block A Block B 
Space exploration 
Highways and bridges 
Agriculture 
Health  
The environment 
Parks and recreation 
Medical research 
Welfare 
Note: The issues in bold were the four target issues whose importance respondents subsequently 
rated.  
 
The level-of-spending questions carry the presupposition that the issues are 
important ones; as a result, respondents might give a higher importance rating to these 
issues.  By contrast, when the target issue was not included among those in the spending 
questions, the absence of the presupposition would lead to a lower importance rating.  
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The second factor varied how the importance questions were asked.  Questions 
were either asked in a direct way (“How important do you think the environmental issues 
are to the country?”) or a filter was used (Do you think the environmental issues are 
important to the country or not?”).  The direct question had five response categories 
(“very important,” “somewhat important,” “neither important nor unimportant,” 
“somewhat unimportant,” or “very unimportant”).  The filter question offered three 
response options (“important,” “neither important nor unimportant,” and “unimportant”).  
If respondents chose either “important” or “unimportant,” a second question asked them 
to indicate the extent of importance (or unimportance) by selecting one of the two 
response categories (“very important/unimportant,” and “somewhat 
important/unimportant”).  My hypothesis was that respondents would rate an issue as 
more important when the importance question was posed without a filter.  Table 4.11 
displays the number of completed interviews by experimental condition. 
Table 4.11. Experiment 6: Number of Completes by Experimental Condition 
 Block A Block B Total 
Direct Questions 304 255 559 
Filtered Questions 264 248 512 
Total 568 503 1071 
Target questions. All respondents were asked to express their concern about the 
four target issues after the importance rating questions (e.g., “How concerned are you 
about the environmental issues then?”).  The concern question had four response options 
(“very concerned,” “somewhat concerned,” “slightly concerned,” and “not concerned at 
all”).  The concern question was included to assess the impact of presuppositions on 
survey responses.  
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4.3.3 Results 
The main outcome variables of interest were the responses to the importance and 
concern questions.  
Importance ratings. In this experiment, the key inferences involved the 
presuppositions carried by the two triggers (i.e., the fact of asking a prior question about 
the target issue and the direct question format).  Responses to the filter version of the 
importance questions were recoded to the corresponding five response categories as the 
direct questions.  Higher numbers indicate higher importance ratings.  To test the 
hypotheses that respondents would see the issue as more important when it was included 
in the block of spending questions, and when the importance question was posed without 
a filter, I examined the mean importance ratings by experimental conditions.  Results 
from two-way ANOVAs showed that the format of importance questions significantly 
influenced the mean importance rating for three out of the four target issues (see Table 
4.12).   
Table 4.12 shows that the hypothesis regarding the format of importance 
questions are not completely supported.  The direct question elicited a higher mean 
importance rating for one of the issues (the environment) than the corresponding filtered 
question, but the difference was only marginally significant (p<.08).  The question format 
made no significant difference at all on the mean importance rating for the issue related 
to parks and recreation.  For issues related to highway and bridges and agriculture,  
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Table 4.12. Importance of Four Issues by Question Format 
 Direct 
%
Filtered
%
Significance Tests 
Environmental Issues 
Very Important 
Somewhat Important 
Neither Important Nor Unimportant 
Somewhat Unimportant 
Very Unimportant   
 Total   
 
52.7 
 35.4 
 7.0
3.7 
 1.2
100.0 
 
48.1 
 33.5 
 15.4 
 1.6
1.4 
100.0 
 
N
Mean 
% Choosing Important Options 
512 
4.35 
88.1%
559 
4.25 
81.6% 
 
F(1,1067)=3.24, p<.08 
X2=8.49, p=.004 
Issues Related to Highway and Bridges
Very Important 
Somewhat Important 
Neither Important Nor Unimportant 
Somewhat Unimportant 
Very Unimportant 
 Total 
 
34.8 
 54.5 
 7.4
2.7 
 0.6
100.0 
 
52.2 
 30.8 
 15.2 
 1.4
0.4 
100.0 
 
N
Mean 
% Choosing Important Options 
512 
4.20 
89.3%
559 
4.33 
83.0% 
 
F(1,1067)=7.5, p<.01 
X2=6.61, p=.01 
Agricultural Issues 
 Very Important 
Somewhat Important 
Neither Important Nor Unimportant 
Somewhat Unimportant 
Very Unimportant 
 Total 
 
47.4 
 38.2 
 10.4 
 3.2
0.8 
100.0 
 
66.0 
 20.9 
 12.3 
 0.5
0.2 
100.0 
 
N
Mean 
% Choosing Important Options 
508 
4.28 
85.6%
559 
4.52 
86.9% 
 
F(1,1063)=24.3, p<.0001
X2=0.13, ns 
Issues Related to Parks and Recreation 
Very Important 
Somewhat Important 
Neither Important Nor Unimportant 
Somewhat Unimportant 
Very Unimportant 
 Total 
 
19.9 
 46.9 
 21.5 
 9.2
2.5 
100.0 
 
30.3 
 27.8 
 36.0 
 4.1
1.8 
100.0 
 
N
Mean 
% Choosing Important Options 
512 
3.72 
66.8%
558 
3.81 
58.1% 
 
F(1,1066)=1.89, ns 
X2=8.54, p=.0004 
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the direct questions produced significantly lower importance ratings than the filtered 
versions, which is opposite to the hypothesis.  Examination of the univariate distribution 
of the two importance questions (see Table 4.12) revealed that for these two issues, the 
filtered version yielded a higher percentage of respondents choosing the “very important” 
option than the “somewhat important” option, pushing up the mean ratings. 
I next collapsed the five-point importance scale so that the upper end of the scale 
(“very important” and “somewhat important”) constituted one category and the remaining 
three options a second category.  I conducted logit analyses on these dichotomized 
variables.  The results revealed that whether a filter is used or not has significant effect on 
the percentage of respondents who chose the important end of the scale for three out of 
four issues (see X2 values reported in Table 4.12).  Consistent with the finding by 
Sterngold and colleagues (1994), respondents gave fewer responses at the upper end of 
the scale when first presented with a filter question than with a direct question.  
Whether the issue was asked in the previous block of spending questions had a 
significant impact on the ‘highway and bridges’ and ‘agriculture’ issues, but not on the 
other two target issues (see Table 4.13).  It is clear from Table 4.13, the hypothesis 
regarding the block variable was not supported.  For environmental issues and issues 
related to parks and recreation, whether respondents regarded the target issue as 
important seemed to be independent of whether the target issue was mentioned in the 
previous block.  However, for the other two issues (highway and bridges, and agriculture), 
the effect of including the issues among the spending questions was significant, but 
opposite from the predicted direction – when the target issue appeared in the previous 
block, fewer respondents regarded them as important.  Since both issues were included in 
95
the spending questions along with “space exploration” and “health,” it is possible that 
respondents could have contrasted health and the two target issues (highway and bridges, 
and agriculture) when evaluating spending on them and this contrast effect may have 
affected the later importance ratings.  
Table 4.13. Mean Importance Ratings (and Percent Selecting Options Above Midpoint) 
by Whether Issue Included In Prior Block 
 Asked in Previous 
Block 
Not asked in 
Previous Block 
F Values Pr>F
Mean Rating (% selecting important 
options) 
 
Environment 4.29 (84.7%) 4.30 (84.7%) F(1,1067)=.04 ns 
Highway and bridges 4.21 (83.1%) 4.32 (89.3%) F(1,1067)=5.16 p=.02 
Agriculture 4.34 (82.7%) 4.49 (90.4%) F(1,1063)=9.18 p=.003
Parks and recreation 3.80 (64.1%) 3.74(60.6%) F(1,1066)=.87 ns 
There were no significant interaction effects for the two manipulations for any of 
the issues.   
Responses to concern questions. Respondents were asked how concerned they 
were with all four target issues after they rated the importance of each issue.  When the 
presuppositions resulting from the two triggers (asking the issue in a previous block and 
the direct question format) suggested to respondents that the issue was an important one, 
the respondents might include this presupposition in the common ground and use it when 
answering the concern items.  Specifically, when respondents think an issue is important, 
they might feel that they ought to be concerned with that issue.  Table 4.14 displays the 
correlation between the importance items and the concern items, with the correlation 
coefficients ranging from .55 to .63.  It seems that the presupposition of importance alone 
can explain 30 to 40% of the variance of the concern items. 
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Table 4.14. Correlations Between Importance Items (Inference Questions) and Concern 
Items 
Issues Correlation 
Environment .63 
Highway and Bridges .60 
Agriculture .55 
Parks and recreation .62 
4.3.4 Conclusions  
The final experiment examined the effects of question format and prior questions 
on respondents’ inferences about the importance of issues and on responses to subsequent 
concern questions.  Consistent with the findings by Knauper (1998) and Sterngold et al. 
(1994), direct questions in the format of “How important do you think __ is?” were found 
to carry a presupposition that the issue is an important one.  Respondents were more 
likely to choose the upper end of the response scale (the important options) when 
presented with a direct than a filtered question.  On the other hand, the mean ratings of 
importance showed reversals for two of the four items.  
The very act of asking a question in a previous block of questions itself didn’t 
carry the presupposition as originally hypothesized.  It turned out that the previous block 
containing the target issues created a contrast effect, which affected respondents’ 
inferences about the importance of the items. 
 The effect of the presupposition of importance can be seen through the significant 
correlations between the importance questions and the concern questions.  The 
importance ratings explained about 30 to 40% of the variance in responses to the concern 
questions.  
97
Linguists have long noted that presuppositions triggers differ in their ability to be 
neutralized.  They distinguish hard triggers from soft triggers (see Abbott, 2005).  Soft 
triggers are easily neutralized in a given context.  One reason that the manipulation of 
including an issue in a previous block did not come out as expected is probably because 
that trigger is a soft one, whose presupposition can be easily canceled or suspended.  The 
contrast effect lends some support to this speculation.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Discussion  
 
5.1 Summary of Results  
This dissertation included six experiments that sought direct evidence that the 
four Gricean maxims are at work in the survey response process.  Table 5.1 summarizes 
the experimental conditions and the main findings from the six experiments.  
 Experiment 1 varied the physical arrangement of survey questions on web pages, 
presenting a set of six loosely related items one question per screen, all on the same 
screen, or all in a grid on a single screen.  But the physical arrangement did not seem to 
lead respondents to see the items as more (or less) strongly related.  Although the 
relatedness ratings didn’t provide direct evidence that respondents applied the maxim of 
relation, the responses (i.e., inter-item correlations) did differ by physical arrangement.  
When the introduction didn’t mention anything about the relatedness (or unrelatedness) 
of the items, the grid condition produced the highest intercorrelations (measured by 
Cronbach’s alphas) among the six items, partially replicating the previous research on the 
effects of physical arrangement (see Couper et al., 2001; Tourangeau et al., 2004).  
However, when the introduction told the respondents that the items were related, the grid 
yielded the lowest intercorrelations.  It seemed that a grid format triggered different 
inferences and led to different results depending on the introduction given to the items.   
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Table 5.1. Summary of Results
Chapter Maxim IVs DVs Results
Chapter 2,
Experiment 1
Relation -Physical arrangement of
survey questions on web
screens (Grid vs. Multiple
items on same screen vs.
single item per screen)
-Introduction
-Intercorrelations
-Inferences (perceived
relatedness ratings)
-Physical arrangement had no significant effect on
intercorrelations; effect of introduction marginally
significant; no significant interaction effect
-Neither physical arrangement nor introduction had
significant effects on perceived relatedness;
interaction also non-significant
-Hypotheses not supported
Chapter 3,
Experiment 2
Manner -Self-evident definitions for
everyday terms vs. no
definitions
-Response errors
-Response times
-Inferences
-Giving definitions to everyday terms significantly
reduced variances of some questions; significantly
changed the covariance matrix of some questions;
didn’t improve or reduce the accuracy of
classifying instances to food categories
-Giving definitions slowed down respondents with
a high need for cognition, but not those with a low
need for cognition; differences not significant
-Giving definitions didn’t have a significant effect
on respondents’ inference about the purpose and
meaning of the terms
-Some hypotheses were supported, though not
strongly
Chapter 4,
Experiment 3
Relation -Scale values (-3 to 3 vs. 0 to
6)
-Font of numbers (normal vs.
faded)
-Mean shift in responses
-Inferences
(Accuracy of recall,
attention to and usefulness
of numbers, interpretation
of end labels)
-Response times
-Negative scale values produced significant mean
shift
-Fainter font moderated the effect of negative scale
values for two of the four questions
-Marginally significantly more recall of correct
numbers given scale running from -3 to 3
-Significantly higher level of attention to scale
number for -3 to 3 scales
-Significantly more respondents associated -3 with
presence of failure
-Marginally significant longer response time when
given -3 to 3 scale
-Hypotheses regarding numerical values were
supported; some hypotheses regarding fainter font
were supported
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Chapter Maxim IVs DVs Results
Chapter 4,
Experiments 4
and 5
Quantity -Introduction
-Wording (one item reverse
worded vs. none reverse
worded)
-Number of items (2 vs. 4)
-Correlations
-Inferences
-Introduction didn’t have a significant effect on
correlations in experiment 4, but had a marginally
significant interaction effect with the number of
items in experiment 5
-Reversed wording significantly reduced the
correlations
-Four items significantly increased the correlations
compared to two
-Hypotheses partially supported
Chapter 4,
Experiment 6
Quality -Issues raised in a previous
block of questions or not
-Question format (direct vs.
filtered)
-Correlations
-Inferences
-Direct question led to a higher percentage of
responses at the upper end of the scale
-Whether an issue was mentioned previously didn’t
increase the importance ratings
-Presupposition of importance explained about 30%
to 40% of total variance of responses to concern
items
-Hypotheses partially supported
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The use of grids in computerized surveys has been controversial; grids have been 
shown to be challenging to new users (Couper, 2000) but efficient once users have 
oriented themselves to the grid layout (Couper, 2000; Fuchs, 1999).  Grids can increase 
the correlations among attitude items (Couper et al., 2001; Tourangeau et al., 2004), 
though this may represent increased error (Tourangeau et al., 2004).  Despite general 
screen complexity of grids, respondents were found to be faster with them (Couper, 2000; 
Couper et al., 2001).  The present experiment showed that grids are sensitive to 
introductions, pointing to an additional source of variability associated with grids.  These 
results ought to alert survey researchers to use grids with caution.    
The second experiment provided unnecessary (and not very informative) 
definitions for everyday terms like “poultry” in one condition, contrasting this with a 
condition in which respondents did not get any definitions.  Instead of being confused by 
the apparently redundant definitions for terms, respondents seemed to have followed the 
“interpretability presumption” (Clark and Schober, 1992), believing that what survey 
questionnaires say and how they say it are meaningful.  They seemed to incorporate the 
definitions into their interpretation of the survey questions.  A larger percentage of 
respondents inferred that the definitions were intended for someone else or the terms 
were used in a more technical sense when they were given the redundant definitions than 
when they were not given them.  They also seemed to use those redundant definitions; 
their responses to (some of) the key items had significantly smaller variances when 
redundant definitions were present than when they were not.  The covariance structures 
of responses to key items and to related items were changed as well when definitions 
were provided.   
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This experiment had a small sample size (n=160) and low power, contributing to 
the weak evidence that respondents generated inferences based on the maxim of manner.  
The finding that the seemingly redundant definitions reduced variances of responses, 
though contradictory to the “more is less” phenomenon described in Young (1999) and 
Gerber et al. (1996), is encouraging news to survey researchers.  Nonetheless, a larger 
sample size might be needed before we can draw definitive conclusions regarding 
usefulness of definitions for familiar terms.   
The experiment on the numerical labels for scale points and the font in which they 
were presented provided a variety of evidence that respondents worked out an inference 
from the numerical values, drawing on the maxim of relation, and based their responses 
on the inference.  The shift in responses induced by the numerical scale values was 
unexpectedly robust; when a scale started with a negative number, it pushed the 
responses to the right or positive end of the scale across items and across fonts.  Process 
measures such as the recall task, response times, and retrospective probes confirmed that 
respondents paid attention to the numerical labels on the scales, carefully processed the 
negative numbers, and worked out inferences to interpret the verbal labels on the end 
points of the scale.  This experiment provided one more piece of evidence that 
respondents pay attention to peripheral cues (the style elements in Couper et al. 2004); in 
designing questions, we should pay more attention to what we put on the screen or on the 
page.  
Increasing the number of specific questions, rephrasing the question to explicitly 
include the prior specific item, and placing the two questions in different conversational 
contexts seem to prevent respondents from using the maxim of quantity when a general 
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question follows a specific one (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991; Tourangeau, Rasinski, & 
Bradburn, 1991).  Experiments 4 and 5 were intended to examine the factors that may 
have a similar role when two highly similar items at the same level of generality are 
asked together.  I replicated the work of Strack and colleagues (1991) on similar items in 
Experiment 4.  In that study, respondents used the maxim of quantity when two similar 
items were placed in the same conversational context and lower correlations were the 
result.  The tendency to “avoid redundancy” was robust across introductions in 
Experiment 4.  Furthermore, reversed wording seemed to cause people to focus more on 
the conceptual overlap rather than structural dissimilarity; significantly more respondents 
thought the two target items were supposed to measure the same thing when one of the 
items was reverse-worded than when two items were worded in the same direction, 
leading to appreciably lower correlations.  On the other hand, respondents didn’t apply 
the maxim of quantity in all circumstances.  When the number of similar items was 
increased to four (as in Experiment 5), the correlations between the target items rose as 
well, suggesting that respondents stopped applying the “avoid redundancy” rule when 
they saw multiple items bundled together.   
Experiment 6 on the effects of presupposition lent partial support to the existing 
literature that direct questions without a filter carry a presupposition that can influence 
respondents’ subsequent responses.  Experiment 6 examined two methods of conveying 
the presupposition of “importance” by varying whether a particular issue was included in 
a prior block of questions and whether the importance question was asked in a direct way 
without a filter.  Asking about an issue in a prior block turned out to be a weak trigger of 
the presupposition, whose effects were cancelled by the presence of other salient issues in 
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the same block.  By contrast, direct questions without filters have a complex impact on 
survey responses; one the one hand, asking the importance questions in a direct way 
induced significantly more responses at the upper end of the scale – presumably because 
of the presuppositions direct questions carry.  On the other hand, the mean responses to 
the direct questions were significantly lower than those to the filtered questions for two of 
the four issues.   
Close examination of the univariate distributions of responses to these two issues 
revealed that filter questions managed to move respondents away from the “somewhat 
important” option to either the “very important” option or “neither important nor 
unimportant” option (see Table 4.12. in Chapter 4).  In the direct question condition, 
answer categories were listed vertically with “very important” as the first answer 
category on the top.  Responses to the direct questions were roughly evenly split between 
“very important” and “somewhat important” options.  In the filter condition, a filter 
question first asked respondents to indicate whether they thought a certain issue was 
important or not.  If they selected the “neither important nor unimportant” option, they 
would skip the next question; otherwise, they would be asked a degree-of-importance 
question, with the “very important” option being the first answer option on the top.  The 
filter condition seemed to cause respondents either to turn neutral by selecting the middle 
category on the first screen or to become polarized in their answers by selecting the “very 
important” option.   
There seem to be at least two completing explanations for this shift of the answers 
in the filter condition.  The Gricean account predicts that the filter question encourages 
more answers on the lower end of the scale because it doesn’t carry a presupposition of 
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importance; the shift down to the middle category seems to fit this prediction.  The 
follow-up question in the filter condition starts with “How important…?” and again 
carries a presupposition of importance that might have served as a reinforcement to those 
who have selected “important” on the previous screen; thus, leading to polarization.   
A second explanation for this shift of answers is based on Krosnick’s notion of 
satisficing (Krosnick, 1991, 1999).  According to Krosnick, primacy effects (selecting 
earlier response options) and status-quo responses (that is, selecting the middle category) 
are both manifestations of respondents’ selecting responses that reduce the level of effort 
needed to answer the questions.  The observed shift to the middle category and the first 
responses in the filter condition seemed to fit this satisficing account as well.  Both 
accounts are possible; Experiment 6 was not set up to tease apart these two competing 
explanations.  Future experiments are needed to explain the effects on responses of filter 
questions versus direct questions.  In addition, the conflicting evidence of Experiment 6 
should alert us to the importance to examine response distributions before moving to 
aggregate level analysis such as tests of means and/or correlations.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
Among the six experiments aiming to retrieve direct evidence that the Gricean 
maxims are at work during the survey response process, some experiments didn’t provide 
strong evidence that the hypothesized maxims were applied.  However, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that respondents did not use the maxims.  For instance, Chapter 2 
showed that the same screen condition performs quite differently from the grid condition, 
despite the fact that in both conditions respondents were able to read the whole set of 
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questions before answering.  This strongly suggests that the differences between the two 
formats are not driven by a noninterpretive process (e.g., differences in the accessibility 
of information used to answer the earlier items), since both the questions and the question 
order were constant.  Only the layout differed.  Thus, it seems premature to rule out an 
account based on interpretive inferences simply because this experiment didn’t yield 
direct evidence for the predicted inference.   
The question remains why some experiments failed to obtain evidence that 
respondents made the Gricean inferences as they formulated their answers.  One reason 
could be respondents’ limited ability to report on their cognitive processes.  Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) demonstrated that people are not always aware of the existence of stimuli 
that affect their responses or of the stimulus’ impact on their responses.  Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) argued that higher order cognitive processes can occur outside of 
awareness; people had little or no access to their cognitive processes, and, thus, they 
couldn’t report them.  
 
5.2.1 Automatic versus Controlled Processing 
If inferences based on the Gricean maxims were also the product of automatic 
process outside of respondents’ awareness and control, then it would explain the absence 
of significant evidence from some of the experiments.  There is evidence from different 
fields suggesting that at least some linguistic processing is automatic.  The famous 
“Stroop effect” (in which the meaning of a color word makes it harder to say what color 
it is printed in) is one example.  The Stroop effect shows that extracting word meaning is 
automatic – it happens without our intent and it is impossible to stop.  Paradis (1998, 
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2002) argues more generally that linguistic competence is acquired incidentally, stored 
implicitly, used automatically, and subserved by procedural memory.   
Research in the field of neurolinguistics and cognition, involving ERP (event-
related brain potentials), indicates that people go through different cognitive processes 
when conducting syntactical and semantic analysis.  For instance, Hahne and Friederici 
showed that the first pass of syntactic analysis – the initial representation of structure – is 
mostly automatic (Hahne & Friederici, 1999).  However, infrequent or incorrect 
syntactical structures tend to call for a more controlled second passing (Hahne & 
Friederici, 1999).  Hahne and Friederici (2002) further presented that semantic aspects of 
sentence comprehension involve controlled processes.  Both papers demonstrated that 
people went through different processes with syntactically (or semantically) correct 
sentences versus syntactically (or semantically) incorrect sentences.  In another study 
indicating that both automatic and controlled processes are involved in comprehension, 
Hill and his colleagues showed that access to semantic memory by spreading activation is 
automatic, but that integrating prime and target words into a semantic context is a 
controlled process (Hill, Strube, Roesch-Ely, & Weisbrod, 2002).  
There is not much direct evidence on the role of automatic and controlled 
processes in pragmatic processing.  But a few findings from Gibbs’ work on 
conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts are worth mentioning (Gibbs, 1981, 
1986, 1997).  First, people recognize a distinction between what speakers say and what 
they implicate in particular contexts (Gibbs, 1997).  Similarly, people know which 
indirect requests fit in different situations and view the one that fits the situation best as 
conventional (Gibbs, 1981, 1986; see Austin, 1962, on his original postulations of direct 
108
versus indirect speech acts).  Furthermore, people are generally faster in understanding 
conventional indirect requests than unconventional ones in a particular context (Gibbs, 
1981, 1986).   Gibbs’s work suggests that conventional utterances are understood via an 
automatic process, even if they involve indirect requests.  This is analogous to Hahne and 
Friederici’s finding that correct sentences are automatically processed (Hahne & 
Friederici, 1999, 2002).   
 To sum up, linguistic processing in general seems to employ both types of process.  
Language processing starts automatically as we draw on our pool of vocabulary, 
grammar, and common knowledge to understand and respond to sentences (or utterances).  
However, we can switch to controlled processes when situations call for it.  Incorrect use 
of words, infrequent syntactic structures, and apparently inappropriate fit to contexts all 
fall into this category.   In terms of conversational inferences based on Gricean maxims, I 
would argue for the same dual set of processes.  Most of the conversational implicatures 
such as generalized conversational implicatures, metaphors, and sarcasm, are processed 
automatically.  People pick up the implicature instantly without intention, control, and 
awareness.   As a matter of fact, people pick up the “what is implicated” so automatically 
that some metaphors or implicatures have lost their novelty and become clichés.  On the 
other hand, people switch to controlled processes when they encounter surprising 
information or when automatic processes failed to yield a reasonable meaning to a 
sentence or an utterance.   
 This dissertation didn’t provide much direct evidence to substantiate these 
assertions regarding automatic versus controlled processing of Gricean implicatures; this 
was not my focus.  However, some experiments produced indirect evidence regarding 
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process.  For instance, in the experiment on the numerical labels of rating scales 
(Experiment 3 in Chapter 4), response time measures showed that people were generally 
slower when they were given a scale starting with a negative number (-3) and they were 
more likely to recall that numerical label than their counterparts who were given a scale 
beginning with 0.  A scale starting with 0 is less surprising and the processing of it is 
probably automatic; this would explain the poorer recall of that label.  By contrast, a 
negative number is quite novel and surprising information, which caught people’s 
attention and triggered more controlled processing.  This experiment provides some 
evidence that Gricean effects could be both automatic and controlled depending on the 
context.    
 
5.2.2 Gricean Effects or Satisficing 
Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinki (2000) outline the typical cognitive processes 
involved when respondents answer survey questions: comprehension of survey questions, 
retrieval of relevant information, judgment and estimation, and reporting answers.  They 
note that respondents may adopt different response strategies, slacking on certain 
cognitive steps and skipping others.  Krosnick dubbed such respondents “satisficers” 
(Krosnick, 1991, 1999; see also Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski, 2000 for a review).   
 Krosnick distinguished two types of satisficing (Krosnick, 1991, 1999).  The 
weak satisficers execute all four components of the response process, but do not execute 
them as thoroughly as they should.  They settle for merely satisfactory answers rather 
than the most accurate ones (Krosnick, 1999: p548).  By contrast, the strong satisficers 
skip the retrieval and judgment and estimation components altogether and base their 
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responses on peripheral cues.  Strong and weak satisficing each produce certain types of 
measurement errors (see Krosnick 1991, 1999 for a review).  For instance, agreeing with 
assertions is one manifestation of strong satisficing whereas picking earlier responses in a 
visual mode is a manifestation of weak satisficing.  
 Do the results obtained from the six experiments here reflect Gricean inferences 
or respondents’ satisficing?  As a matter of fact, results such as the mean shift caused by 
a negative number, or the different response distribution produced by variations in 
question order were first regarded as measurement errors (“artifacts”) on the part of 
respondents.  Superficially, it looks like satisficing respondents could be at fault.  
However, as Schwarz (1996) pointed out, these response patterns are not errors caused by 
lazy or poorly motivated respondents.  Rather, they are due to respondents’ efforts to help 
out by being good respondents.  Respondents use what they know – including 
conversational maxims or rules – in answering survey questions.  Even Krosnick 
acknowledge that respondents applied conversational rules in survey or experimental 
setting in his research (Holbrook, Krosnick, Carson, & Mitchell, 2000; Krosnick, Li, & 
Lehman, 1990).  As discussed in Chapter 1, it is now widely accepted that respondents 
bring conversational maxims to the survey research setting (Schwarz, 1996).  
 Just as not everyone satisfices in survey response, not everyone uses 
conversational rules.  McCabe and Brannon (2004) demonstrated that only people with a 
high need for cognition adhered to the “avoid redundancy” rule and described the use of 
conversational maxims as optimizing behaviors.  That seems to put Gricean’s 
conversational rules in opposition to Krosnick’s satisficing account.  However, I disagree 
with this view of satisficing and application of Gricean maxims as polar opposites.  
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Krosnick proposed a continuum indicating the degrees of thoroughness in the response 
process with strong satisficers as the one end and optimizers as the other (Krosnick, 1991, 
1999).  Pragmatic processing involves both low effort automatic processes and high 
effort controlled processes.  Thus, both the satisficers and optimizers may draw automatic 
inferences based on Gricean maxims, but only the optimizers will carry out the more 
controlled processes that require extra effort.  It is unwise to use a black-and-white model 
to integrate satisficing and Gricean effects, given the complexity of human language use. 
To conclude, this dissertation provided limited evidence that respondents used the 
Gricean maxims in survey response processes and observed some changes in responses 
under different manipulation conditions.  More systematic research is required to pursue 
the topic further.  Additional experiments, including ones that incorporate other 
techniques such as eye tracking or cognitive interviews may help to uncover the 
mechanisms affecting survey responses.  
.
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